Three Essays on Robust Estimation of Key Factors Underlying the Changes to the U.S. Income Distribution by Ghosh, Pallab
Syracuse University 
SURFACE 
Dissertations - ALL SURFACE 
May 2014 
Three Essays on Robust Estimation of Key Factors Underlying the 
Changes to the U.S. Income Distribution 
Pallab Ghosh 
Syracuse University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/etd 
 Part of the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ghosh, Pallab, "Three Essays on Robust Estimation of Key Factors Underlying the Changes to the U.S. 
Income Distribution" (2014). Dissertations - ALL. 119. 
https://surface.syr.edu/etd/119 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the SURFACE at SURFACE. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Dissertations - ALL by an authorized administrator of SURFACE. For more information, please contact 
surface@syr.edu. 
Abstract
This dissertation consists of three chapters and mainly focuses on the robust estimation
of different important factors contributing changes to the U.S. income inequality over the last
two decades. The primary objective is to precisely estimate different labor market outcomes
when the behaviors of the tails of the distribution bear much importance. These studies
are very relevant in the current context of the U.S. labor market because over the last three
decades the U.S. income distribution have come very skewed and therefore, we are more
interested at the behaviors of the the upper and lower-tails of the U.S. income distribution
compared to the middle.
The first chapter of the dissertation proposes a semi-parametric procedure to determine
the contribution of human capital variables in explaining the changes of U.S. wage distribu-
tion function over the period of 1990-2000. The effects of these factors are estimated by using
the Chamberlain’s two stage Box-Cox quantile regression approach. One of the main contri-
butions of this chapter is that it relaxes the linearity assumption of the conditional quantile
function to estimate the counterfactual wage distribution function consistently. This chapter
also shows that the proposed method provides better estimates of capturing the effects of
human capital variables in the two tails of the U.S. wage distribution while the results of
other parts of the distribution are comparable with the estimates of the previous study which
used the linear quantile regression approach.
The second chapter proposes a semi-parametric estimation method known as ‘Box-Cox
Unconditional Quantile Regression’ to explain the increasing trend of the U.S. wage inequal-
ity over the last two decades for men and women separately. Box-Cox Unconditional Quantile
Regression is a generalization of the Linear Unconditional Quantile Regression model pro-
posed by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009). The main contribution of this chapter is to
determine the role of unionization in explaining the rising wage gap between the upper and
lower tails of the U.S. wage distribution function during the period 1990-2010. I also show
that proposed Box-Cox unconditional Quantile Regression model precisely estimates the pa-
rameters compared to the Linear Unconditional Quantile Regression model at the two tails
of the U.S. wage distribution function while the results of the rest of the part of the distri-
bution are comparable with the estimates of the previous study by Firpo et al. (2009). To
summarize, this proposed approach is most applicable in cases where the behavior of the tails
of the distribution bears much importance. I find that declining unionization can explain
around 20-25 percent of the total fall in the 50/10 percentile wage gap and does not have
much impact on the rise in the 90/50 percentile wage gap for men over the period 1990-2010.
For women, unionization has very little impact on the rising wage gaps at different parts of
the wage distribution over the last two decades.
In the third chapter I propose an extension of Rosen’s (1986) theory of equalizing differ-
ences model by incorporating the role of different types of cognitive and noncognitive skills in
worker’s job preference function to explain the U.S. labor market sorting mechanism. I show
that ignoring the impact of worker’s skills on occupational choice decision leads to bias and
inconsistent results because of sample selection specification error. This chapter proposes a
solution of the problem by using workers’ education level as the proxy of the cognitive skills.
This chapter also tests the implication of the proposed labor market sorting model by using
the current population survey and Occupational Information Network data sets and finds
that a positive and statistically significant relationship exists between noncognitive skills and
workers sorting behavior. The empirical results suggest that the relative employment share
of women is higher in the occupation in which the people’s task is more important because of
their job preferences, which depend on the level of different types of noncognitive skills such
as interpersonal and social skills. This type of sorting behavior can explain a large portion
of the male-female wage gap.
Three Essays on Robust Estimation of Key Factors
Underlying the Changes to the U.S. Income Distribution
By
Pallab Kumar Ghosh
B.S. in Economics, University of Calcutta, 2005
M.S. in Quantatatitve Economics, Indian Statistical Institute, 2007
DISSERTATION
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economics of
the Graduate School of Syracuse University
Advisors: Professor Thomas Kniesner and Professor Jeffrey Kubik
May 2014
Copyright©2014 Pallab Ghosh
All rights reserved
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisors Professor Thomas Knies-
ner and Professor Jeffrey Kubik for their continued intellectual, motivational and financial
support through the roller-coaster ride called doctoral studies. Immense gratitude is due to
my parents and family members for their sustained mental support during all these years
I spent away from them. Special thanks to my elder brother Biplab Ghosh. I would never
have been able to finish my dissertation without his guidance and encouragement.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank my dissertation committee members Pro-
fessor Badi Baltagi, Professor Duke Kao and Professor William Horrace and the committee
chair, Professor David Popp. I am very grateful to Professor Gary Engelhardt and Professor
Perry Singleton for their comments and suggestions. I am also indebted to my colleagues and
friends including Dr. Alissa Dubnicki, Ian Wright, Kul Kapri, Liu Tian, Shimeng Liu, Chong
Li, Lincoln Groves, Pengju Zhang, Christian Buerger, Judson Murchie, Edoardo Rainone,
Mallory Vachon, Jaeyoon Lee with whom I had many enlightening discussions. Many thanks
to all the staff members of the Economics Department and the Center for Policy Research
for their continued support on administrative works over the last five years.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
CHAPTER
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. The Contribution of Human Capital Variables to Changes in the
Wage Distribution Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Econometric Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.1 Model Set Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.2 Chamberlain Buchinsky Two Step (CBTS) Estimation . . . 12
2.2.3 Test for Box-Cox Conditional Distribution Model . . . . . 13
2.2.4 Counterfactual Wage Distribution Function . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2.5 Decomposition of Changes in Wage Distribution . . . . . . 15
2.2.6 Asymptotic Properties of the Decomposition Method . . . 17
2.3 Data and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3.1 Overall Changes in Wage Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3.2 Decomposition Method Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
III. The Role of Unionization on the U.S. Wage Inequality During the
Period 1990-2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2 Review of Decomposition Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3 Econometric Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.3.1 Model Set Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
vi
3.3.2 Model Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.3.3 Markup Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3.4 Decomposition of Changes in Wage Distribution . . . . . . 52
3.3.5 Construction of Distributional Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4 Data and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.4.1 Changes in the U.S. Wage Distribution Function . . . . . . 57
3.4.2 Counterfactual Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.4.3 Effects of Unionization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
IV. Sorting in the Labor Market Based on Workers’ Noncognitive Skills 86
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.2 Economic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.2.1 Job Preference Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.2.2 Sorting Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.2.3 Implementation of the Sorting Model . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.4 Labor Market Sorting Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
vii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure
2.1 Male Weekly Log Wage Density and Distribution Function for the Years
1990 and 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.2 Decomposition Results by Linear and Non-linear Quantile Regression Methods 33
3.1 Top 10 Percent Income Share in the United States from 1913-2012 . . . . . 69
3.2 90/10, 90/50 and 50/10 Percentile Wage Gap in the Period 1975-2012 . . . 70
3.3 90/50 and 50/10 Male Female Percentile Wage Gap over the Period 1990-2012 71
3.4 Percentage of Male Female Union Workers over the Period 1990-2012 . . . 72
3.5 Decomposition of Male and Female Union Workers by Education . . . . . . 73
3.6 Plot of the Markup Factor (1 + λτqτ )
(λτ−1)/λτ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.7 Changes in the Unconditional Male and Female Wage Distribution from
1990-2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.8 Decomposition of Male Female Wage Distribution Function for the Period
1990-2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.9 Unconditional Partial Effects of Union for the Period 1990-2010 . . . . . . 77
viii
LIST OF TABLES
Table
2.1 Descriptive Statistics (Percentage and Average Wage) for the Period 1990-
2000 by Education, Experience and Race . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.2 Conditional Distribution Model Specification Test for Year 2000 . . . . . . 34
2.3 Estimated Changes in the U.S. Male Unconditional Wage Distribution over
the Period 1990-2000 by Using the Quantile Regression and Box-Cox Quan-
tile Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.4 Decomposition of Wage Distribution Function for the Period 1990-2000 by
Using the Quantile Regression and Box-Cox Quantile Regression . . . . . . 36
2.5 Impacts of Human Capital Variables to Changes in the Male Wage Distri-
bution Function over the Period 1990-2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.6 Regression and Quantile Regression Models for the College High School Log
Wage Gap, 1963-2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.7 Regression and Quantile Regression Models for the College High School Log
Wage Gap by Potential Experience Group 1963-2005, Males and Females
Pooled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.8 100 × Observed and Composition Constant Changes in Overall and Residual
Wage Inequality Measures by Using Counterfactual Decomposition Method 40
3.1 Summary Statistics of Current Population Survey Data for All . . . . . . . 78
3.2 Summary Statistics (Mean and Standard Deviation) of Current Population
Survey Data for Male and Female . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.3 Composition of Union Workers by Education Level and Percentage Wage
Gap between Union and Non-union Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
ix
3.4 Change in Unconditional Wage Distribution from 1990-2010 . . . . . . . . 81
3.5 Decomposition of Wage Distribution Function over the Period 1990-2010 . 82
3.6 Box-Cox Unconditional Quantile Partial Effects of Unionization from 1990-
2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.7 Linear Quantile Regression Marginal Effects of Unionization from 1990-2010 84
3.8 Effects of Declining Unionization on Wage Inequality Over the Period 1990-
2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.1 Summary Statistics of ONET and CPS Data for All . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.2 Summary Statistics of ONET and CPS Data for All by Occupation . . . . 114
4.3 Labor Market Sorting Results for All Workers : Multinominal Logit Estimation115
4.4 Labor Market Sorting Results By Gender : Multinominal Logit Estimation 116
4.5 Labor Market Sorting Results for By Race : Multinominal Logit Estimation 117
x
CHAPTER I
Introduction
A large literature in labor economics investigates the widening of the U.S. wage structure
over the last three decades (see Autor et al. 2008, Katz and Autor 1999, Bound and Johnson
1992). Many previous studies1 in the income inequality literature have used canonical model
to explain the changes in the U.S. wage inequality because the canonical model is not only
elegant and conceptually attractive but it is also empirically successful. However, most
recently many studies have showed that most of the action has been at the very top of the
U.S. wage distribution function and canonical models fail to provide satisfactory results on
explaining the upper and lower-tail wage inequality in the U.S. labor market over the last
two decades.
One of the main motivations of my dissertation is to explain the asymmetric changes in
the U.S. wage distribution with a steady rise in the upper-tail and a marginal fall in the lower-
tail by using robust estimation methods. The proposed wage decomposition methods are
more applicable when the behaviour of the tails of the distribution bears much importance.
Alverdo et al. (2013) show that the driving force of the steep rise in the upper-tail wage
inequality is due to the substantial increase of real wages in the upper-tail of the U.S. income
distribution. Thus, proposed decomposition methods are relevant to explain the changes in
the U.S. wage structure over the recent years.
1see Katz and Autor (1992), Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998), Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008) and
Carnerio and Lee (2009), among many others.
1
The first chapter proposes a modified wage decomposition method to answer the question
how much returns from education can explain the steep increases in wages in the upper-tail
of the U.S. income distribution during the 1990s. Machado and Mata (2005) use the lin-
ear quantile regression method to construct a counterfactual wage distribution function. In
this chapter, first I show that the linearity assumption of the conditional quantile func-
tion does not hold for U.S. Wage distribution data, especially at the upper-tail of the U.S.
wage distribution function. Thus, Machado and Mata approach provides biased estimates
of the decomposing terms. To solve this problem, this chapter proposes a modified wage
decomposition method by using a flexible nonlinear quantile regression model, namely the
Chamberlain Buchnisky Box-Cox model.
This chapter also shows that the estimated counterfactual distribution function converges
to the true wage distribution function asymptotically. Proposed decomposition method
results show that changes in the composition of the labor force play a secondary role, whereas
the primary source of the asymmetric changes to the U.S. wage distribution during the 1990s
is the changing labor market prices. I also show that the steep increase of the U.S. upper-tail
wage inequality during the 1990s is not caused primarily by the heterogeneous returns from
education.
The primary research question of the second chapter is why the income gap between the
middle class and the poor fell over the last two decades. This fact in labor economics is also
known as polarization of the U.S. economy. In labor economics there is a large literature
which investigates why the high skilled workers are doing very well since 1980 by looking at
the role factors such as, skilled biased technological changes, international trade etc. A large
literature in both labor and public economics examines the role of different public transfer
programs which are mainly targeted to the low skilled workers. Although the growth of real
income for the middle class families has become almost stagnant over the last twenty years,
there are not many studies attempts to explain the stagnation of the middle class families
income.
2
The income gap between middle class and the poor is falling over the last two decades.
This chapter provides an explanation of this fact by using the role of declining unionization.
Unionization rate declined approximately one third for men and majority of those union
workers are high school graduates. The hypothesis is middle class families average income
fell because of this pattern of de-unionization. Current Population Survey (CPS) March
outgoing rotation sample data for the period 1990-2010 is used to test this hypothesis. I
have used ‘Unconditional Quantile Regression’ method to find out the effects of the declining
unionization on wages for all the workers at each point of the income distribution; OLS or
Quantile Regression estimates the effects of de-unionization for only union workers.
One of the main contributions is that this study has developed a variant of the Linear
Unconditional Quantile Regression or a special form of the Nonlinear Unconditional Quantile
Regression. This is build up from the first chapter which shows that the linear relationship
between the dependent variable logarithm wages and unionization rate does not hold at
different parts of the income distribution when the income distribution data are highly
skewed. The proposed Nonlinear Unconditional Quantile Regression model finds out the
impact of unionization on wages for all the workers in a robust way by constructing a
counterfactual wage distribution function which is defined as union structure remains the
same as in 1990 and all the other variables are distributed in 2010.
The effects of unionization at different parts of the income distribution are estimated by
subtracting the counterfactual wage distribution function from the actual wage distribution.
Estimated results suggest that declining unionization can explain approximately 20-25 per-
cent changes of the 50/10 percentile wage gap for male over the last two decades and has no
effect to the changes in female 50/10 percentile wage gap because there was not much change
in female unionization rate over the last two decades. This question still remain unsolved in
labor economics literature and this chapter provides a plausible explanation.
The third chapter investigates the question why the relative employment shares of women
are higher in the occupations in which people’s task is more important. The proposed labor
3
market sorting model is an extension of the theory of equalizing differences proposed by
Rosen (1986). In this framework, workers’ job preferences not only depend on the job
characteristics and monetary compensation, but also depend on workers’ different types of
cognitive and noncognitive skills; moreover, individuals vary in their stock of cognitive and
noncognitive skills and jobs differ in terms of the task levels.
Labor market sorting behavior plays an important role to explain the trends of gender and
racial wage gaps over the last two decades. Borghans, Weel and Weinberg (2006) investigate
whether changes in the importance of the noncognitive skills can explain why women’s wage
increased more rapidly, while the wages of black grew more slowly over these years relative
to earlier years in the U.S. labor market during the period of the late 1970s to the early
1990s.
Labor market sorting behavior plays an important role why does the male-female wage
gap fall in the U.S. labor market over the last two decades, especially at the upper tail of the
income distribution? However, during the same period the black-white wage gap remains
steady. Borghans, Weel and Weinberg (2006) investigate whether changes in the importance
of the noncognitive skills can explain during the period of the late 1970s to the early 1990s
why women’s wage increased more rapidly, while the wages of black grew more slowly over
these years relative to earlier years in the U.S. labor market.
Proposed labor market sorting model is used by using the Occupational Information
Network (O*NET) and CPS data. These data sets allow us to investigate which types of
noncognitive skills have significant impact on different types of occupations. Additionally,
this paper also shows the labor market sorting results by gender and race. There are two
main contributions of this chapter in the labor market sorting literature. First, the proposed
labor market model shows that without considering the impact of workers’ cognitive and
noncognitive skill levels on their occupational choice decisions leads to famous sample selec-
tion specification error. This study proposes a solution to this problem by using education
levels as proxies of the workers’ cognitive skills.
4
Estimated marginal effects of different types of noncognitive skills to choose occupations
such as clerical and sales, and service with respect to the occupation professional, managerial
and technical are almost always greater than 1 in a multinominal logit model. Although the
relative magnitude of the coefficients varies a lot by race and gender, these results hold for
different types of model specifications. Thus, workers’ noncognitive skills can explain a large
portion of the existing labor market sorting.
5
CHAPTER II
The Contribution of Human Capital Variables to
Changes in the Wage Distribution Function
2.1 Introduction
Developing new decomposition methods to explain the changes in the wage distribution
function has been an extensive research area for the last twenty years. The main reason for
continued interest in this topic is that wage inequality in several countries, specifically in
the United States, has increased sharply since the early 1980s. Autor et al. (2008) show
that the slowing of the growth of overall wage inequality in the 1990s hides a divergence in
the paths of upper-tail (90/50) and lower-tail (50/10) inequality. The upper-tail inequality
has increased steadily since 1980, even adjusting for changes in the labor force composition;
lower-tail inequality rose sharply in the first half of the 1980s and contracted thereafter. In
this paper, I focus on the role human capital variables play in causing changes in the U.S.
wage distribution function during the period of 1990 to 2000.
This paper proposes an extension of the decomposition method proposed by Machado
and Mata (2005). The aim is to estimate a counterfactual distribution function F , which is
of the form
F (w) =
∫
G(w|x)dH(x).
Here G(.) is the conditional Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of wage (w) given
6
the covariates (X) in period t = 0 and H is the unconditional CDF of X in period t = 1.
Machado and Mata (2005) estimate the inverse of G through a linear quantile regression
model and estimate the integral through a simulation method. Machado and Mata (2005)
point out that one of the limitations of their approach is that the linearity assumption of
the conditional quantile function may be violated in many scenarios when applying real life
data. This paper shows that the linearity assumption does not hold when G(.) is a very
skewed distribution function.
Barsky et al. (2002) show that the Oaxaca-Blinder (1973) decomposition, based on
the linear regression model, yields biased estimates of the decomposing terms when the
underlying conditional expectation of Y given X is nonlinear. The Barsky et al. (2002)
results can be extended in the quantile regression framework. This extension implies that
the Machado and Mata (2005) approach gives consistent results only where the conditional
quantile function is approximately linear.
In this paper, I suggest a flexible nonlinear quantile regression model for G, namely
the Chamberlain Buchnisky Box-Cox model. The main reason for proposing this model is
that the shape parameter in the Box-Cox model adjusts with each quantile of the wage
distribution function to estimate the conditional quantile function. I also develop the formal
asymptotic properties of the proposed decomposition method and apply the method by using
U.S. labor market data for the period of 1990-2000 from the American Community Survey.
Recently, there have been several papers that have studied decomposition methods, in-
cluding Chernozhukov et al. (2013a), Rothe (2010a, 2012a, b), Firpo et al. (2011, 2007),
Antonczky et al. (2010), Altonji et al. (2008), Melly (2005), and DiNardo et al. (1996). (See
also the extensive survey by Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (2011) on the wage decomposition
literature.) These papers show how the function G mentioned above can be estimated by a
wide range of parametric, semi-parametric or non-parametric methods.
DiNardo et al. (1996) analyze the effect of a change in the conditional distribution of a
single covariate given the remaining ones (see also Donald et al. (2000) and Gosling et al.
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(2000)). Hirano et al. (2003) and Firpo (2007, 2010) establish the efficiency of this estimation
method. However, the DiNardo et al. (1996) method becomes practically infeasible when
there are too many continuous variables. Moreover, re-weighting can have some undesirable
properties in small samples when there is a problem of common support. Frolich (2004) finds
that re-weighting estimators perform poorly in this context.
Rothe (2010a) proposes a fully non-parametric method to find the effect of an exogenous
change in the distribution of covariates on the unconditional distribution of the outcome
variable. In the wage decomposition literature, many researchers including Chernozhukov et
al. (2013a), Firpo et al. (2011, 2007), and Machado and Mata (2005) propose parametric
models. Using a correctly specified parametric model results in efficiency gains compared to
the fully nonparametric method; however, such estimators are generally inconsistent when
the parametric assumptions are violated.
Most recently, Rothe (2012a) measures the partial effect of a counterfactual change in
the unconditional distribution of a single explanatory variable on some features of the un-
conditional distribution of Y in the context of a non-separable model. In a related paper,
Firpo et al. (2009) estimate the impact of changing the distribution of explanatory vari-
ables X on the marginal quantiles of the dependent variable Y or other functionals of the
marginal distribution of Y . By using either of the methods, one can directly calculate the
distributional features. Firpo et al. (2009) identify their models only when X is exogenous.
Rothe (2010b) estimates the unconditional partial effects in a nonseparable triangular model
with endogenous regressors by using the control variable approach proposed by Imbens and
Newey (2009).
Machado and Mata (2005) consider the effect of a change in the unconditional distri-
bution of one of the covariates while holding constant the conditional distribution of the
remaining covariates. Chernozhukov et al. (2013a) introduce the distributional regression
model that corresponds to either changes in the distribution of the covariates, or changes
in the conditional distribution of the outcome given covariates, or both. Chernozhukov et
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al. (2013a) argue that the distributional regression is an alternative to quantile regression.
Thus, both the approaches provide similar results when the support of X is sufficiently rich.
Chernozhukov et al. (2013a) point out that Machado and Mata’s (2005) method works
well if Y has a smooth conditional density and may provide a poor approximation of the
conditional distribution function when Y is discrete or consists of mass points. In contrast,
distributional regression does not require smoothness of the conditional density because the
approximation is done point-wise in the threshold Y , and thus handles continuous, discrete,
or mixed Y without any special adjustment.
This paper contributes to the previous literature by developing a flexible decomposition
method to analyze the differences in the distribution of individuals’ economic outcomes across
two countries, time periods or subgroups of the population. In particular, the results can be
used to make inference on the change of the distribution function as a whole, its moments,
quantiles, and inequality measures such as the Lorenz curve or Gini coefficient. I also show
that the estimated counterfactual distribution function of the proposed method converges to
the true distribution function asymptotically. This asymptotical property of the proposed
decomposition method establishes the validity of the inference procedure.
The empirical contribution of this paper is that the proposed decomposition method can
precisely estimate the contribution of human capital variables especially in the two tails of the
wage distribution function. In comparison with the proposed decomposition method results,
I find that the Machado and Mata (2005) approach underestimates the price effects of labor
market in the lower-tail and overestimates in the upper-tail of the U.S. wage distribution
function for the period 1990-2000. Differences in the rest of the parts of the wage distribution
function are not statistically significant.
The proposed decomposition method results show that there is a steady rise in upper-
tail wage inequality and a flat or declining lower-tail wage inequality during the 1990s. The
results are consistent with Autor et al. (2008). Autor et al. (2005) called this phenomena
the ‘polarization’ of the U.S. labor market, with a particularly strong market for workers
9
in the top parts of the skill distribution and, at the same time a deterioration in market
conditions for workers in the middle, and reasonably steady market conditions for those near
the bottom.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the econometric model, the
construction of the counterfactual wage distribution function, and the decomposition of the
wage distribution function. In section 3, I discuss the data, show the empirical results and
also compare the results with the conventional wisdom of the wage inequality literature. I
conclude in section 4. All the proofs are shown in the Appendix.
2.2 Econometric Model
The Mincer equation is the most widely used specification of the empirical earnings
equation in the labor economics literature. This equation is typically specified in the linear
functional form. A more general approach would be not to constrain the model to linear
form but rather to let the data determine the exact transformation that results in a linear
relationship between the dependent variable and the covariates. Box-Cox (1964) suggests
such a model in a nonlinear set up.
2.2.1 Model Set Up
The econometric model I use in this paper specifies that the τth conditional quantile
of w (wage), given x (Quantτ (w|x)), depends on a linear index, x′βτ , through a nonlinear
function g(.), that is,
Quantτ (w|x) = g(x′βτ , λτ ) (2.1)
where g(.) is strictly monotonically increasing in x′βτ and also depends upon the parameter
λτ . Moreover, w > 0, x ∈ Rk are observed, while the parameters βτ ∈ B ∈ Rk and λτ ∈ R
are unknown and τ ∈ (0, 1).
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The specification of model (1) is quite flexible because it depends on the linear index x′βτ
and allows the whole transformation to change for each different quantile τ ∈ (0, 1). Powell
(1991) shows the Box-Cox (1964) transformation can be estimated in a nonlinear quantile
regression framework.
In the Box-Cox transformation, the inverse of g(x′βτ , λτ ) is given by
wλ = g
−1(w, λ) =

(wλ − 1)/λ if λ 6= 0
log(w) if λ = 0,
(2.2)
assuming λ ∈ R and R = [λ, λ̄] to be a finite closed interval. The advantage of using the
Box-Cox transformation is that it preserves the ordering of the observation due to the equi-
variance property of quantiles with respect to the monotonically increasing wλ. Therefore,
Quantτ (wλ|x) = g−1 (Quantτ (w|x)) . (2.3)
Using the Box-Cox transformation as the inverse of g(x′βτ , λτ ), equation (1) becomes
Quantτ (w|x) = (λτQuantτ (wλ|x) + 1)1/λτ (2.4)
Buchinsky (1995) shows that the Box-Cox transformation specified in (2) satisfies the prop-
erty
Quantτ (wλ|x) = x′βτ . (2.5)
By using the equations (4) and (5), the conditional quantile function of w given x becomes
Quantτ (w|x) = (λτx′βτ + 1)1/λτ . (2.6)
Note that the conditional quantile function, Quantτ (w|x) becomes linear when λτ = 1.
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The estimation of βτ and λτ is studied by Powell (1991), Chamberlain (1994), Buchinsky
(1995) and Fitzenberger et al. (2010). Box-Cox quantile regression minimizes the distance
function
min
βτ∈B,λτ∈R
1
n
n∑
i=1
ρτ (wi − (λτx′iβτ + 1))
1/λτ , (2.7)
where the loss function is given by ρτ (u) = τ |u|Iu≥0+(1−τ)|u|Iu<0 and I denotes the indicator
function. Powell (1991) shows that these nonlinear estimators λ̂τ and β̂τ are consistent and
asymptotically normal.
2.2.2 Chamberlain Buchinsky Two Step (CBTS) Estimation
Chamberlain (1994) and Buchinsky (1995) suggest the following two step procedure which
exploits the equi-variance property of quantiles:
Step 1: Estimate βτ (λτ ) conditional on λτ by
β̂τ (λτ ) = arg min
βτ∈B
1
n
n∑
i=1
ρτ (wλi − x′iβτ ) (2.8)
Step 2: Estimate λτ by solving
min
λτ∈R
1
n
n∑
i=1
ρτ
(
wi − (λτx′iβ̂τ (λτ ) + 1)1/λτ
)
(2.9)
Chamberlain (1994) shows the asymptotic distribution of the CBTS estimators. Buchinsky
(1995) derives large sample properties of this estimator for discrete regressors when applying
the minimum distance method.
Fitzenberger et al. (2010) address a numerical problem for implementing the CBTS
estimation method. They argue that the estimation problem given in (9) can only be solved
if
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λτx
′
iβ̂τ (λ̂τ ) + 1 > 0 (2.10)
for all i = 1, 2, ..., n and for all λτ ∈ R. Fitzenberger et al. (2010) suggest to solve this
problem by incorporating a indicator function in the second step of the estimation. The
indicator function takes a constant value whenever the condition in (10) fails to satisfy.
This modification guarantees that the objective function is a well defined sum from 1 to n.
Fitzenberger et al. (2010) show that the modified estimator has similar asymptotic properties
to the original CBTS estimator.
2.2.3 Test for Box-Cox Conditional Distribution Model
In this subsection, I test the correct specification of the conditional distribution model
using the Generalized Conditional Cramer-von Mises (GCCM) test proposed by Rothe and
Wied (2013). Let F be the class of all conditional distribution functions on the support of
Y given X that satisfy all the regularity conditions shown by Rothe and Wied (2013). We
consider a parametric family
F0 = {F−1(τ |x) = g(x′βτ , λτ ) for some θ ∈ B(τ,Θ)} ∈ F ∀ τ ∈ (0, 1)
.
The hypothesis Rothe and Wied (2013) propose to test is that F coincides with an element
of F0.
H0 : F (y|x) = F (y|x, θ0) for all (y, x) ∈ Rk+1
H1 : F (y|x) 6= F (y|x, θ0) for some (y, x) ∈ Rk+1
The test statistics Tn and the bootstrap α critical values ĉn(α) have been computed by
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following the procedure shown by Rothe and Wied (2013) where ĉn(α) is the smallest constant
that satisfies
Pb(Tb,n ≤ ĉn(α)) ≥ 1− α,
and Pb is the probability with respect to bootstrap sampling and Tb,n is the bootstrap test
statistics. Rothe and Wied (2013) test rejects H0 if Tn > ĉn(α) for some pre-specified
significance level α ∈ (0, 1).
2.2.4 Counterfactual Wage Distribution Function
I use CBTS estimators to construct the counterfactual wage distribution. The steps are
as follows:
1. Draw random sample of size m from τ ∈ (0, 1) : τ1, ..., τm.
2. For each τ ∈ (0, 1), using the CBTS estimators, estimate the following conditional quantile
function
Q̂g,τ = g(x
′β̂τ , λ̂τ )
=
(
λ̂τx
′
tβ̂τ + 1
)1/λ̂τ
.
3. Use the estimated result to draw a random sample from {wit=1}
m
i=1, {wit=0}
m
i=1 and{
wc,it=1
}m
i=1
where
{
wit
}m
i=1
= F−1wt|xt(τi, xt) = g((x
i
t)
′β̂τ , λ̂τ ); t = 0, 1{
wc,it=1
}m
i=1
= F−1wt=1|xt=1
(
Fwt=0|xt=0(wt=0, xt=0), xt=0
)
.
Here wc,it=1 denotes the ith draw from the counterfactual wage distribution function. F
−1
wt|xt(τi, xt)
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are the τith conditional quantile functions for the periods t = 0, 1. F
−1
wt=1|xt=1(
.) is the τith
counterfactual conditional quantile function.
The counterfactual wage distribution function consists of two parts. The first operator
F−1wt=1|xt=1 ensures that the market return of the covariates remains fixed at period t = 1
whereas the second part
(
Fwt=0|xt=0(wt=0, xt=0), xt=0
)
implies that the distribution of covari-
ates remains constant at period t = 0.
2.2.5 Decomposition of Changes in Wage Distribution
The main objective of constructing a counterfactual wage distribution function is to use it
to decompose differences in distributions. I use the extended Oaxaxa (1973) decomposition
method like DiNardo et al. (1996), Machado and Mata (2005), and Firpo et al. (2007, 2011)
to decompose the differences in distribution of wages in the years 1990 and 2000.
The main analysis of changes in the distribution functions of wage between the period
t = 0 (year 1990) to period t = 1 (year 2000) is as follows:
F (wt=1)− F (wt=0) = [F (wt=1)− F (wt=1;xt=0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Composition Effect
+ [F (wt=1;xt=0)− F (wt=0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Wage Structure Effect
+Residual
The first bracket represents the effect of changes in the distribution of covariates which is
denoted as the composition effect. The second bracket represents the effect of changes in
the market returns of the human capital variables which we call the wage structure effect,
and the rest is called the residual effect. The advantage of this decomposition is that we can
decompose all the standard summary measures such as Gini coefficients, Theil coefficients,
skewness etc., since we can estimate the whole counterfactual distribution function.
Similarly, we can also measure the impact of individual covariates (x̃t) by considering the
following equation
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Impact of x̃t ≡ F (wt=1)− F (wt=1;x′t=1, xt=0) ,
where xt = [x̃t|x′t] and x′t are all the other covariates except x̃t. The counterfactual distribu-
tion function F (wt=1;x
′
t=1, xt=0) can be recovered from F (wt=1;xt=0) by assuming x̃t ∈ xt
follows independent distribution.
The independence assumption allows us to write the joint distribution of the covariates
as the product of the marginal distributions. The assumption may not hold in different
scenarios. However, we can relax this assumption and estimate F (wt=1;x
′
t=1, xt=0) by using
either the fully non-parametric or the spline method. The tradeoff is a relatively small
marginal efficiency gain at the cost of computational complexity.
This decomposition is quite attractive since the measurement of the impact does not
depend on the ordering, unlike the DiNardo et al. (1996) method. Autor et al. (2005)
show that this decomposition provides a precise link between the ‘full variance accounting’
technique for analyzing inequality introduced by Juhn et al. (1993) and the kernel re-wighting
proposed by DiNardo et al. (1996). However, Rothe (2012b) points out that most of the
previous decomposition methods, including Machado and Mata (2005), are not additive in
the sense that the sum of the effects of all individual covariates is not equal to the effect of
changing all covariates.
The preciseness of the estimated impact of human capital variables of the proposed
method depends on the total number of quantiles at which we estimate the conditional
quantile function. In this paper, I take 3,000 quantiles between 0 and 1 to construct the un-
conditional wage distribution function. Theoretically, the more quantiles the better, but one
of the drawbacks of the proposed decomposition method is that it is computational intensive
and the computational time is greater compared to the simulation method introduced by
Machado and Mata (2005).
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2.2.6 Asymptotic Properties of the Decomposition Method
I show the following two asymptotic properties of the proposed decomposition method.
The proofs of the properties are shown in the appendix.
(i) Complete Mappings: Assume that the conditional cumulative distribution function
of wt given xt, Fwt|xt(wt|xt), is monotonically increasing over the domain of wt ∈Wt and Wt
is closed and bounded in Rk for t = 0 and 1, where k is the row dimension of Wt. Then we
have
F (wt) ≡
{
F−1wt|xt(τi)
}m
i
as m→∞,
where m is the number of draws.
(ii) Convergence in Distribution: Let θ̂c be the quantile estimator that minimizes the
counterfactual conditional quantile function of w given x, gc(θc). We define a random variable
Y = g(x′t=0β
t=1
τ , λ
t=0
τ ) and assume that the distribution function of Y , F (x
′
t=0β
t=1
τ , λt=0)
exists. Let Ŷn = gn(x
′
t=0β̂
t=1
τ , λ̂
t=0
τ ) have a distribution function Fn(.) for each n. Then,
under the regularity conditions as shown by Powell (1991), we obtain
Fn(Ŷn)
d→ F (Y ) as n→∞.
2.3 Data and Results
The data are drawn 1 percent self weighted 1990 and 2000 samples from the American
Community Survey. The data consists of U.S.-born black and white men aged 40-49 with
at least five years of education, positive annual earnings and hours worked in the year
preceding the census, and a nonzero sampling weight. The wage measure used is a weekly
wage measure computed by dividing the annual earnings by the number of weeks worked
in the previous year. I have restricted my sample sizes to 30,000 for both the years 1990
and 2000 to reduce the computational time for the simulation method used in the empirical
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analysis. The regressors consist of years of schooling and other basic controls1. Potential
experience for men has been calculated by subtracting 6 and number of schooling years from
the age variable.
Table 1 shows between group changes in wages and labor force composition in the samples
1990-2000 for groups defined by education, potential experience and race. The third column
indicates that there are about 1 to 2 percent more high school, some college and college
graduates and 2 to 3 percent less high school drop out and post college graduate workers in
the year 2000 compared to 1990. These differences imply that although the average education
level remain almost the same over the period 1990 to 2000, the relative fraction of the low
skilled workers has decreased. The sixth column indicates that the average racial wage gap
has fallen approximately 2 percent in our samples.
In Table 2, I report the empirical rejection probabilities from n replications of the simu-
lation process discussed by Rothe and Wied (2013), where the values of n are 50, 100, and
200. We see that for the year 2000, the linear quantile regression model leads to an adequate
fit of the conditional male wage distribution data becuase we reject the null hypothesis of
linear specification. We also note that the linear quantile regression model rejection rates
are always higher than the Box-Cox quantile regression models at both 10 percent and 5
percent critical levels. This implies that the linear quantile regression model specification
used in the empirical analysis is not the best model specification for our sample data.
Rothe and Wied (2013) point out that rejection of the null hypothesis does not directly
imply that such specifications result misleading conclusions. However, for large samples
Rothe and Wied (2013) argue that the Generalized Conditional Cramer-von Mises (GCCM)
test is able to pick up deviations from the null hypothesis even if they are not economically
significant magnitude. Thus, by using the Box-Cox Quantile Regression model we can obtain
1In the regressors, I have excluded various determinants of earnings such as tenure and occupation dum-
mies because these variables are potentially endogenous and determined by education itself (Angrist and
Pischke (2009)). Annual income is expressed in 1989 dollars using the Personal Consumption Expenditures
Price Index.
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more precise results at those quantiles of the wage distribution function for which the linearity
assumption in parameters is a poor approximation of the conditional quantile function.
Moreover, the linear and log-linear Quantile Regression models are special cases of the Box-
Cox Quantile Regression model.
2.3.1 Overall Changes in Wage Distribution
The top part of Figure 1 shows how the probability density function changes from 1990 to
2000 and the bottom panel shows the same for the U.S. wage distribution function. We see
that the area under the wage density curve of the upper-tail in 2000 is greater in comparison
to 1990. This difference implies that the employment opportunities for the high-skill workers
has gone up compared to the moderately and low skilled workers during the 1990s in the
U.S. labor market. The result is in line with the Autor et al. (1998) findings on relative
demand growth for the high-skill workers during the 1990s.2
The bottom part of Figure 1 represents the fraction of workers’ wage less than a given
wage. By comparing the cumulative distribution functions of both the years, we see that
employment shares of the very low and high skilled workers increased while employment
shares for the moderately skilled workers contracted during the 1990s. Firpo, Fortin and
Lemieux (2011) argue that the recent changes in task-based occupational structure play a
very important role to explain this phenomenon. Acemoglu and Autor (2010) propose a
task-based framework for analyzing the allocation of skills to task for studying the effect of
new technologies on the labor market and their impact on the distribution of earnings.
Table 3 shows the changes in the estimated unconditional wage distribution by using both
the Quantile Regression and the Box-Cox Quantile Regression simulation methods. In the
seventh row, the term ‘Scale’ refers to the percentage change in the wage gap between the
75th quantile and 25th quantile. The random samples from the wage distribution functions
2Card and DiNardo (2002), Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) emphasize more on the role of Skill Biased
Technological Changes (SBTC) in the US wage structure.
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have been generated through the steps described in Section 2, with the number of replications
equal to 3,000. The numbers in the parentheses indicate the 95 percent bootstrap confidence
interval which has been generated by 1,000 replications.
By comparing the third and sixth columns of Table 3, we note that the linear quantile
regression and the Box-Cox quantile regression models give us statistically different results in
the upper-tail of the male wage distribution. Proposed decomposition method estimates the
changes in wages as 9 to 23 percent in the upper-tail of the U.S. wage distribution function
while the Machado and Mata (2005) method estimates are 1 to 7 percent. However, both
Machado and Mata’s (2005) decomposition method and proposed approach show that there
are marginal changes in wages in the lower-tail. This difference at the upper-tail is because
the linearity assumption in the parameters of the conditional quantile function is unable to
capture the precise changes in the upper-tail of a very skewed wage distribution function.
Our results on U.S. wage inequality are qualitatively similar to Autor et al. (2008), Goos
and Manning (2003) and Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003). This pattern of changes in the
U.S. wage distribution in the 1990s differs sharply compared to the 1980s, with more rapid
growth of real wages at the top of the wage distribution relative to the middle and the bottom
of the wage distribution. Goos and Manning (2003) and Autor, Katz and Kearney (2005)
characterize this pattern as the polarization of the U.S. labor market. This pattern suggests
a central role for labor demand shifts in explaining changes in the U.S. wage distribution
function during the 1990s.
2.3.2 Decomposition Method Results
In Table 4, the wage distribution function has been decomposed into three parts, namely
composition effect, wage structure effect and residual effect. Row by row, I report the esti-
mates of these three effects for different quantiles and various inequality measures. Proposed
decomposition method results show that the wage structure effects are roughly 1.5 to 2 times
larger than the composition effects. These results suggest that during the 1990s, the primary
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source of changes in the wage distribution is the wage structure effect. The composition effect
plays a very minor role.
The residual effect is defined as the unexplained part of the change in the wage distri-
bution as shown in Table 3. By comparing the third and sixth columns of Table 4, we note
that the residuals from the proposed method are smaller than those from the Machado and
Mata (2005) method for all parts of the distribution except the region around the median.
The results in Table 4 are consistent with the properties of the Quantile Regression esti-
mators. The linear Quantile Regression provides the best estimators when the conditional
quantile function is linear. Angrist et al. (2006) show that Quantile Regression gives the
minimum mean-squared error linear approximation to the conditional quantile function even
when the linear model is misspecified. Buchnisky (1995) gets similar results like ours by
using Minimum Distance (MD) estimators for the Box-Cox Quantile Regression model.
The results of Table 3 and Table 4 have been summarized in Figure 2. The top left
panel of Figure 2 shows that the gaps between the estimated changes in wages for the linear
and nonlinear Quantile Regression approaches increase in the higher quantiles of the wage
distribution function. The residual effects have been shown in the bottom right panel. As
shown, the absolute values of the residuals of the nonlinear Quantile Regression approach
are significantly in the two tails of the wage distribution compared to the residuals from the
linear Quantile Regression approach introduced by Machado and Mata (2005).
This can be explained by using the other three subplots of Figure 2. The top right and
bottom left panels show that the composition effects are similar in both methods but the
absolute values of wage structure effects from the linear Quantile Regression approach are
higher compared to the proposed Box-Cox Quantile Regression method at the two tails.
Since the linear Quantile Regression method underestimates the changes in wages in the
upper-tail and marginally overestimates in the lower tail of the distribution, the absolute
values of the residuals are higher at the two tails of the distribution compared to the proposed
wage decomposition method.
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The next part of the decomposition measures the impact of individual workers’ character-
istics such as education, experience and race. This extended Oaxaca decomposition method
takes care of the unobserved heterogeneity in returns to education (Henderson et al. 2011)
by assuming the distribution of unobserved skills remains the same over the two time period
we consider. Thus by using this type of decomposition method, we can only compare similar
types of workers in two time periods. Alternatively one can use the Instrumental Variable
Quantile Regression (IVQR) approach proposed by Chernozhukov and Hansen (2006, 2008,
2013b) to address the unobserved heterogeneity issue. Although the IVQR method has been
applied in many research fields, it is rather new to the human capital variables literature3.
The second column of Table 5 shows that had the distribution of education remain the
same as in 1990, then the 90/50 percentile wage gap would have increased by 4.2 percent. The
inequality increasing effect of education is directly driven by the increase of the estimated
effects for education in the upper tail of the wage distribution. The impact of race does
not have much contribution to the changes in wage distribution function. The fifth column
shows that the residuals contribute approximately 8 to 13 percent of the total changes in the
U.S. wage distribution during the 1990s. Melly (2005) and Lemieux (2006) both find that
residual factors account for about 20 percent of the increase in wage inequality during the
period 1973 to 1989.
2.3.3 Discussion
It is important to see how the results of our proposed decomposition method compare
with the conventional wisdom of the existing wage inequality literature. Our results suggest
that the dominating factor of the recent changes in the U.S. wage inequality is the wage
structure effect. Machado and Mata (2005), Autor et al. (2005, 2008) and Firpo, Fotin
and Lemieux (2011) apply different decomposition methods to different data sets but obtain
similar results. Another finding of this paper is that had the distribution of labor force
3Wang (2013) and Arabsheibani and Staneva (2012) used IVQR method to find out heterogeneous returns
to education.
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remained the same as in 1990, the 90/50 wage gap would have increased roughly by 16
percent 4 and our estimated effects of returns to education can explain only one fourth of this
change. Buchnisky (1994) shows that the differences of returns to education have increased
from 0.73 to 2.32 percent over the period 1978 to 1987. Katz and Murphy (1992) find that
college wage premium compared to the high school graduate has increased approximately
2.6 percent per annum during the period 1963-1987.
For a direct comparison with the results of Autor et al. (2008), I have used their same data
to explain the trends in U.S. wage inequality over the period 1963-20055. Table 6 represents
regression models for the overall college high school wage gaps following the specifications
proposed by Autor et al. (2008). In addition, I add quantile regression estimates for the
10th, 50th and 90th quantiles6. Models 3 and 4 consider linear time trends along with the
college high school relative supply, real minimum wage and male prime-age unemployment
rate whereas models 1 and 2 allow more flexible time trends by incorporating quadratic and
cubic functions. By comparing the first and third columns of the four different specifications,
we note that OLS estimates are very similar to the median regression.
The quantile regression estimates from the four specifications suggest that the range
of the college wage premium estimates is 1.5 to 3.3 percent per annum from the lower-
tail to the upper-tail of the wage distribution. The OLS estimates of the relative supply
measures are significantly different from the quantile regression estimates at the two tails of
the wage distribution. The Quantile Regression estimated elasticity of substitution between
high school and college graduate workers varies over the range 1.07(1/0.93) to -1.82(1/-0.54)
from the lower-tail to upper-tail of the wage distribution. These estimated elasticity of
substitution between high school and college graduate workers can not explain the changes
in the upper-tail wage inequality and this is consistent with Autor et al. (2008) since they
also argue that the two-factor CES model fails to provide an adequate explanation of the
4The difference between the fifth and third row of wage structure effect at Table 4.
5See Table 1 in Autor et al. (2008) for descriptive statistics and appendix for data preparation details.
6I do not include nonlinear quantile regression estimates because the nonlinear quantile regression esti-
mates from the statitical software ‘R’ are infeasible for 43 observations.
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evolution between wage inequality since the early 1990s.
Table 7 shows the regression and quantile regression models for the college high school
wage gaps by overall and four different experience groups. The inverse of the aggregate
supply coefficient represents the aggregate elasticity of substitution; similarly, inverse of
the coefficients for the first row show the partial elasticity of substitution between different
experience groups within the same education group. Consistent with Autor et al. (2008),
the quantile regression estimates also suggest that there are substantial effects of both own
group and aggregate supplies on the evaluation of the college wage premium by experience
groups.
Autor et al. (2008) find that aggregate elasticity of substitution in Table 7 models are
very similar to the aggregate models in Table 6 which is also true in the upper-tail of the
wage distribution, shown in the 4th and 8th column. However, in the lower tail, the values of
the aggregate elasticity of substitution are significantly different in Table 6 and Table 7. This
implies that the return to college for the low-experienced workers is different compared to the
medium-experienced (20-29 years) and older workers (30-39 years). The partial elasticity of
substitution between experience groups is very consistent across the wage distribution and
similar to the OLS estimate of 3.55 as shown by Autor et al. (2008). The lower panel
shows that the OLS and median regression estimates are very similar for the four experience
groups.
Table 8 summarizes the overall and residual inequality over the period 1963-2005 by using
the proposed counterfactual wage decomposition method. For the counterfactual analysis,
Autor et al. (2008) use a model which consists of 95 dummy variables: full set of age
dummies, dummies for nine discrete schooling categories, and a full set of interactions among
the schooling dummies and a quartic in age and no continuous variable. I do not use the
same covariates as used by Autor et al. (2008) to avoid the computational complexity of the
interior point algorithms for quantile regression as discussed by Koenker (2005)7; rather I
7See Roger Koenker (2005) ‘Quantile Regression’ for detailed discussion. Standard statistical softwares
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follow the same specification used in the main empirical analysis for consistency. To construct
the counterfactual wage distribution function by using the simulation method as described
in Section 2, I use 5,000 replications. The numbers in Table 4 represent the effects of labor
market prices on the overall earnings inequality while holding labor force composition at the
base years 1973, 1989 and 2005.
For comparison with Autor et al. (2008), we begin by discussing the overall wage inequal-
ity. The upper panel of Table 4 shows that the male 90/50 percentile wage gap (upper-tail
wage inequality) rose during both halves of the sample by 10.3 percent from 1973 to 1989
and 15.4 percent from 1989 to 2005. We note that the price effects can explain almost all
changes in the upper-tail wage inequality. For females, the 90/50 percentile wage gap rose
by 11 percent between 1973 to 1989 and 12.9 percent between 1989 to 2005. Again holding
labor force composition constant at its 1973, 1989 and 2005 levels gives us results similar
to the men. The middle and bottom panels of Table 8 show the price effects for 50/10 and
90/10 percentile wage gaps for both men and women. These results suggest that the basic
message, price effect dominates the composition effect, does not change for both men and
women over the period 1973-2005.
Autor et al. (2008) conclude that “Changes in labor force composition do not substan-
tially contribute to an explanation for the diverging path of upper and lower-tail inequality,
either overall or residual, over the past three decades”. As shown in Table 8, our findings are
qualitatively similar with the conclusions of Autor et al. (2008) although we use a simpler
model specification and a different counterfactual decomposition method to obtain the price
effects and composition effects. For residual inequality, I find that for the period 1989-2005,
in most of the cases price effects are the dominating factors for changing in residual wage
inequality which is consistent with Autor et al. (2008). However for the period 1973-1989, I
find that although price effect plays a significant role to changes in residual wage inequality,
it is not the dominating factor as suggested by Autor et al. (2008).
fail to provide quantile regression estimates for the models which have too many dummy variables.
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To conclude, Autor et al. (2008) use a structural model and college wage premium
compared to high school graduate as a measure of returns to education whereas this paper
uses a canonical Mincer earnings equation and constructs a counterfactual wage distribution
function to estimate the returns from human capital variables. However, the results from
the main empirical application and comparison with Autor et al. (2008) demonstrate that
although the relative magnitudes of the price effects from the proposed method are higher
in some cases, especially for the wage gap between the two tails of the distribution, these
results are qualitatively similar. Our results find even stronger price effects for the overall
wage inequality compared to Autor et al. (2008) especially for the 90/10 percentile wage
gap; however, the main conclusion remains the same. Autor et al. (2008) point out that
their counterfactual analysis depends on the partial equilibrium assumption that prices and
quantities are independent which is precisely to the opposite spirit of the supply-demand
analysis; the proposed method does not require such a strong economically unappealing
assumption.
2.4 Conclusion
This paper proposes a modified wage decomposition method based on a very popular
approach proposed by Machado and Mata (2005). First, I show that the linearity assumption
of the conditional quantile function does not hold for the U.S. male wage distribution data
at the year 2000 by using the Generalized Conditional Cramer-von Mises (GCCM) test
proposed by Rothe and Wied (2013). To overcome this linearity issue, I use the Chamberlain
Buchinsky Two Step Box-Cox Quantile Regression method. The advantage of this method
over the linear quantile regression method is that the shape parameter of the Box-Cox
transformation adjusts with each quantile of the wage distribution to capture the nonlinear
shape of the conditional quantile function.
This paper also shows that the estimated counterfactual distribution function by us-
ing the Box-Cox Quantile Regression method converges to the true distribution function
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asymptotically. This asymptotic property ensures the validity of the inferences based on the
decomposition method results. By using the re-sampling procedure, I also show that theo-
retically we can fully recover the unconditional wage distribution function. This implies that
we need a large number of draws to construct a counterfactual wage distribution function. I
have used 3,000 draws for the empirical analysis and 5,000 draws for the comparison results
with Autor et al. (2008).
This paper also implements the proposed decomposition method to determine the impact
of human capital variables that contribute to changes in the male wage distribution function
over the period 1990-2000. Proposed decomposition method results show that changes in
the labor force composition do not contribute an explanation for the steep rise in wages
at the upper-tail of the U.S. wage distribution during the 1990s. This result is consistent
with Autor et al. (2008) who used a variant of DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) wage
decomposition method for the period 1963-2005. In addition, this paper also shows that
returns from education can explain only a small fraction of the total changes in wages in the
upper tail of the wage distribution and do not explain why the lower tail wage inequality fell
during the 1990s. Thus, return from schooling is not the primary source of recent divergence
of upper-tail and lower-tail wage inequality in the U.S. labor market.
The sources of the asymmetric changes in the U.S. wage distribution with a steady rise in
the upper-tail and a marginal fall in the lower-tail during the 1990s still remain unresolved.
Autor et al. (2008) show that hypotheses such as falling minimum wages, relative demand
growth for more skilled workers and skill biased technological change fail to fully explain the
upper-tail inequality paired with declining lower-tail inequality. Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux
(2011) use unconditional quantile regression method to explain the changes in the U.S. wage
structure over the last three decades by looking at the roles of skilled biased technological
changes and job offshorability. Katz and Murphy (1992) and Autor, Katz and Krueger
(1998) propose an explanation based on relative demand growth for high skilled workers and
fluctuations in relative skill supplies based on canonical supply demand models. However,
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this argument is unable to explain the slowdown in relative demand growth during the early
1990s.
There is no unique explanation for the complex pattern of changes in the U.S. wage
distribution function during the 1990s. Having argued that labor market institutional factors,
skill biased technological change, relative demand for skilled labor, effects of international
trade and their dynamic interactions play very important roles in explaining changes to the
wage distribution function; this paper provides an explanation of these asymmetric changes
in the U.S. wage distribution function by considering the role of human capital variables in
the canonical Mincer earnings framework and finds that changes in the composition of the
labor force play a secondary role, whereas the primary source of the asymmetric changes in
the U.S. wage distribution during the 1990s is the changing labor market prices. This paper
also shows that the steep increase of the upper-tail wage inequality in the U.S. labor market
during the 1990s is not caused primarily by the heterogeneous returns from education.
Appendix
Proof of property 1: Complete Mappings
By assumption, Fwt|xt(.) is monotonically increasing over the domain of xt so the inverse
F−1wt|xt(τ) exists and is well defined. Since τ ∈ (0, 1), by applying the probability integral
transformation theorem we set
τ = Fwt|xt(wt)
⇒ F−1wt|xt(τ) = wt.
So for each value of τ ∈ (0, 1) we get a unique draw from Fwt|xt(.). We know that the number
of values τ can take in (0, 1) is countable infinite. Again, by assumption, Wt is closed and
bounded in Rk so for each value of wt ∈ Wt, we can find a unique τ ∈ (0, 1). This implies
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that as the number of draws (m) goes to infinity we can recover every possible values from
Fwt|xt(wt).
Proof of property 2: Convergence in Distribution
Under some regularity conditions, Powell (1991) shows in Theorem 2, the joint distribu-
tion of θt =
λtτ
βtτ
 for t = 0 and 1 is,
√
n
(
θ̂t(τ)− θ0(τ)
)
d→ N
(
0, H tn(θ)
−1V tn(θ)H
t
n(θ)
−1) . (2.11)
The Hessian matrix Hn is
H tn(θ
t) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[
fw(g(x
t
i, θ
t)|xti)ġti(θt0)(ġti(θt0))′
]
(2.12)
where fw(g(.)|xti) is the conditional density of wi given xi, ġi = δg(xti, θt)/δθt and
V tn(θ
t) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
ψi(θ
t)[ψi(θ
t)]′ (2.13)
where ψi(θ
t) = [τ − I(wi < g(xti, θc))] ti(θt) and
ti(θ
t) = min
[
δ−si[h(x
t
i, θ
t)]
δh
,
δ+si[h(x
t
i, θ
t)]
δh
]
. (2.14)
The counterfactual conditional quantile function obtained from the simulation method de-
scribed in the Section 2 has the form
wci = q(f(xi, θ
c) + uci)
= gc(xi, θ
c, uci)
where uci is the error term. Note that the superscript c denotes the counterfactual. The
above function can be rewritten in the form of a nonlinear regression model with additive
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error,
wci = g(xi, θ
c) + vci where v
c
i = g(xi, θ
c, uci)− g(xi, θc)
Assumptions:
A1. The transformation gc(xi, θ
c, ui) is of the form
gc(xi, θ
c, uci) = s
c[hc(xi, θ
c, uci), xi] ≡ sci [hc(xi, θc, uci)] (2.15)
where h(xti, θ, ui) is scalar valued and continuously differentiable with respect to θ and si(.)
is (right and left) differentiable and satisfies the other regularity conditions described by
Powell (1991).
A2. The parameter vector θc0 = ((λ
c
0)
′, (βc0)
′)′ is an interior point of the parameter space Θ
By assumption θ̂c is the quantile estimator that minimizes gc(.) and, also by using the above
two assumptions, we obtain the following F.O.C.
Ψcn(θ̂
c) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
τ − I(wi < g(xti, θc))
]
ti(θ
c) = 0 (2.16)
where
ti(θ
c) = min
{
δ−si[h(x
t
i, θ
t)]
δh
,
δ+si[h(x
t
i, θ
t)]
δh
}
δh(xi, θ)
δθ
.
Denoting ψi(θ
c) = [τ − I(wi < g(xti, θc))] ti(θc) we have,
Ψcn(θ̂
c) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
ψci (θ̂
c) = op(
1√
n
). (2.17)
Now the relation in equation (17) has been established, the conditions of Theorem 2 of
Powell (1991) have been satisfied. By applying Powell’s result shown above, we obtain the
asymptotic normality of the estimator θ̂c
√
n
(
θ̂c(τ)− θc0(τ)
)
d→ N
(
0, Hcn(θ)
−1V cn (θ)H
c
n(θ)
−1) (2.18)
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where Hcn(θ
c) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
E [fw(g(x
c
i , θ
c)|xci)ġci (θc0)(ġci (θc0))′] , V cn (θc) = 1n
n∑
i=1
ψi(θ
c)[ψi(θ
c)]′, and
fw(g
c(.)|xti) is the conditional density of wci given xi, ġci = δgc(xti, θc)/δθc.
The next step is to show that Yn is a continuous function of θ
c ∈ Θ where Θ is the parameter
space of θc. We can write Yn as a composite function of h1 and h2 in the following way:
Y = gc(x′t=0β
t=1
τ , λ
t=0
τ )
=
(
λt=0τ x
′
t=0β
t=1
τ + 1
)1/λt=0τ
= h1(h2(.))
where h1 = 1/λ
t=0
τ and h2 = λ
t=0
τ x
′
t=0β
t=1
τ + 1. We note that h1 and h2 both are continuous
function in the parameter space Θ. By applying the theorem (Walter Rudin, Theorem 4.10,
page 87) which states a continuous function of a continuous function yields a continuous
function, we conclude that Yn is continuous in θ
c. Now by applying the Continuous mapping
theorem we obtain the following result,
Fn(Ŷn)
d→ F (Y ) as n→∞
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Graphs and Tables
Figure 2.1: Male Weekly Log Wage Density and Distribution Function for the Years 1990
and 2000
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Figure 2.2: Decomposition Results by Linear and Non-linear Quantile Regression Methods
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics (Percentage and Average Wage) for the Period 1990-2000
by Education, Experience and Race
Percentage Mean Wage
2000 1990 Changes 2010 2000 Changes
Education
HS Dropout 6.243 9.253 -3.010 6.055 6.025 0.030
HS Grad 24.820 23.643 1.177 6.265 6.272 -0.007
Some College 34.420 32.403 2.017 6.464 6.437 0.026
College Grad 20.177 18.623 1.553 6.860 6.715 0.090
Post College Grad 14.340 16.077 -1.737 7.011 6.869 0.141
Experience
Exp 0-10 yrs 14.290 19.350 -5.060 6.919 6.737 0.181
Exp 11-20 yrs 82.537 75.243 7.293 6.484 6.439 0.045
Exp 20-35 yrs 3.173 5.407 -2.233 6.179 6.157 0.022
Race
White 92.177 92.123 0.053 6.562 6.509 0.053
Black 7.823 7.877 -0.053 6.234 6.161 0.073
Table 2.2: Conditional Distribution Model Specification Test for Year 2000
GCCM-QR GCCM-BCQR
No of Replications 10% 5% 10% 5%
n = 50 0.303 0.157 0.080 0.067
n = 100 0.214 0.147 0.067 0.037
n = 200 0.113 0.085 0.045 0.017
? By Using the Generalized Conditional Cramer-von Mises (GCCM) test proposed by Rothe and
Wied (2013), we test two functional forms of the conditional quanile function for the 5 and 10
percent critical values. The numbers in the table represent the rejection probabilities from n
replications of the simulation process proposed by Rothe and Wied (2013).
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Table 2.3: Estimated Changes in the U.S. Male Unconditional Wage Distribution over the
Period 1990-2000 by Using the Quantile Regression and Box-Cox Quantile Re-
gression
Linear QR Box-Cox QR
Index 2000 1990 Changes 2000 1990 Changes
10th quant 5.663 5.669 −0.005 5.859 5.873 −0.014
(5.660, 5.665) (5.666, 5.671) (5.857, 5.861) (5.872, 5.875)
25th quant 6.074 6.116 −0.042 6.164 6.183 −0.018
(6.072, 6.076) (6.114, 6.118) (6.163, 6.165) (6.181, 6.184)
50th quant 6.467 6.495 −0.027 6.574 6.539 0.034
(6.465, 6.468) (6.493, 6.496) (6.573, 6.575) (6.538, 6.540)
75th quant 6.843 6.830 0.013 6.940 6.844 0.095
(6.842, 6.845) (6.828, 6.831) (6.938, 6.942) (6.843, 6.845)
90th quant 7.291 7.213 0.077 7.378 7.146 0.232
(7.288, 7.294) (7.210, 7.215) (7.376, 7.381) (7.144, 7.148)
Skewness −1.883 −1.099 −0.783 0.575 0.231 0.344
(−1.904,−1.862) (−1.135,−1.064) (0.570, 0.581) (0.226, 0.236)
Scale 0.115 0.107 0.008 0.115 0.103 0.012
(0.115, 0.116) (0.106, 0.107) (0.115, 0.116) (0.102, 0.104)
Gini Coeff 0.081 0.066 0.015 0.052 0.045 0.006
(0.081, 0.082) (0.066, 0.067) (0.052, 0.053) (0.045, 0.046)
? The numbers in the table represent the estimated weekly log wages, therefore their differences
indicate the percentage changes in wages. The numbers in the parenthesis show the 95 percent
bootstrap confidence interval which has been generated by 1000 replications. To construct the
unconditional wage distribution functions, I have used 3000 quantiles between 0 and 1 from
uniform distribution.
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Table 2.4: Decomposition of Wage Distribution Function for the Period 1990-2000 by Using
the Quantile Regression and Box-Cox Quantile Regression
Linear QR Box-Cox QR
Index Composition Wage Structure Residual Composition Wage Structure Residual
10th quant −0.099 −0.224 0.341 −0.088 −0.135 0.208
(−0.100,−0.098) (−0.224,−0.225) (−0.088,−0.089) (−0.135,−0.134)
25th quant −0.047 −0.100 0.141 −0.041 −0.067 0.090
(−0.047,−0.048) (−0.101,−0.100) (−0.041,−0.040) (−0.067,−0.066)
50th quant −0.000 −0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.0294
(−0.001,−0.000) (−0.002,−0.001) (0.001, 0.002) (0.003, 0.004)
75th quant 0.040 0.089 0.128 0.039 0.070 −0.016
(0.040, 0.041) (0.089, 0.090) (0.039, 0.040) (0.070, 0.071)
90th quant 0.076 0.181 −0.247 0.079 0.134 0.016
(0.076, 0.077) (0.181, 0.182) (0.079, 0.080) (0.134, 0.135)
Skewness 0.129 −0.129 0.259 0.105 0.033 0.072
(0.125, 0.133) (−0.134,−0.125) (0.101, 0.110) (0.028, 0.038)
Scale −1.886 −0.575 −1.311 0.486 0.253 0.232
(−1.893,−1.878) (−0.576,−0.573) (0.485, 0.487) (0.253, 0.254)
Gini Coeff 0.388 0.247 0.140 0.267 0.123 0.143
(0.387, 0.389) (0.247, 0.248) (0.266, 0.268) (0.123, 0.124)
? Composition effect measures the impact due to the changes in labor force composition and the
wage structure effect measures the market returns of the workers’ characteristics. The
unexplained part is called the residual effect.
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Table 2.5: Impacts of Human Capital Variables to Changes in the Male Wage Distribution
Function over the Period 1990-2000
Index Education Experience Race Residual
10th quant −0.048 −0.073 −0.027 −0.134
(−0.049,−0.047) (−0.073,−0.072) (−0.028,−0.027)
25th quant −0.030 −0.047 −0.022 −0.081
(−0.030,−0.029) (−0.048,−0.047) (−0.022,−0.021)
50th quant −0.000 −0.007 −0.010 0.016
(−0.001, 0.000) (−0.008,−0.007) (−0.011,−0.010)
75th quant 0.019 0.017 −0.009 0.067
(0.019, 0.020) (0.017, 0.018) (−0.010,−0.009)
90th quant 0.042 0.054 0.002 0.133
(0.041, 0.043) (0.054, 0.055) (0.002, 0.003)
? Impacts of human capital variables are estimated by: F (wt=1)− F (wt=1;x′t=1, xt=0) for x̃t
where x′t represents the set of all the other variables except x̃t.
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Table 2.6: Regression and Quantile Regression Models for the College High School Log Wage
Gap, 1963-2005
(1) (2)
OLS 10th Q 50th Q 90th Q OLS 10th Q 50th Q 90th Q
CLG/HS relative supply −0.609 −0.931 −0.590 0.549 −0.728 −0.459 −0.689 −0.707
(0.102) (0.068) (0.107) (0.010) (0.155) (0.061) (0.206) (0.062)
Log real minimum wage −0.049 −0.150 −0.011 −0.017
(0.051) (0.010) (0.060) (0.016)
Male prime-age unemp rate 0.004 −0.007 0.003 0.004
(0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002)
Time 0.021 0.033 0.023 0.016 0.028 0.015 0.0282 0.022
(0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.010) (0.003)
Time2/100 0.030 0.0267 0.018 0.043 0.017 0.023 0.010 0.038
(0.015) (0.010) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.006) (0.021) (0.008)
Time3/1000 −0.006 −0.007 −0.005 −0.008 −0.005 −0.004 −0.004 −0.007
(0.002) (−0.433) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Observations 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43
R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.952 0.702 0.813 0.838 0.955 0.734 0.814 0.850
(3) (4)
OLS 10th Q 50th Q 90th Q OLS 10th Q 50th Q 90th Q
CLG/HS relative supply −0.403 −0.319 −0.399 −0.600
(0.067) (0.015) (0.105) (0.045)
Log real minimum wage −0.117 −0.234 −0.065 −0.089 −0.144 −0.173 −0.004 0.121
(0.047) (0.018) (0.070) (0.035) (0.065) (0.064) (0.097) (0.028)
Male prime-age unemp rate −0.001 −0.006 −0.001 0.004 −0.018 −0.010 −0.018 −0.008
(0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
Time 0.017 0.014 0.017 0.023 0.006 0.008 −0.006 0.006
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43
R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.944 0.725 0.788 0.838 0.891 0.543 0.712 0.745
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Table 2.7: Regression and Quantile Regression Models for the College High School Log Wage
Gap by Potential Experience Group 1963-2005, Males and Females Pooled
All Experience Groups
OLS 10th Q 50th Q 90th Q OLS 10th Q 50th Q 90th Q
Own supply minus agg supply −0.282 −0.238 −0.296 −0.284 −0.281 −0.212 −0.321 −0.341
(0.027) (0.054) (0.046) (0.036) (0.026) (0.038) (0.039) (0.050)
Aggregate supply −0.600 −0.738 −0.561 −0.507 −0.705 −1.012 −0.732 −0.521
(0.087) (0.149) (0.150) (0.144) (0.130) (0.193) (0.190) 0.209
Log real minimum wage −0.074 −0.126 −0.071 −0.119
(0.037) (0.067) (0.055) (0.058)
Male prime-age unemp rate 0.004 0.009 0.004 −0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Time 0.027 0.034 0.024 0.023 0.031 0.044 0.030 0.023
(0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Time2/1000 −0.009 −0.017 −0.005 −0.005 −0.012 −0.026 −0.010 −0.007
(0.005) (−0.433) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172
R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.863 0.576 0.641 0.682 0.868 0.594 0.647 0.687
Potential Experience Groups 0-9 yrs 10-19 yrs 20-29 yrs 30-39 yrs
OLS Median OLS Median OLS Median OLS Median
Own supply minus agg supply −0.169 −0.173 −0.325 −0.344 0.101 0.052 0.002 0.038
(0.130) (0.101) (0.084) (0.201) (0.084) (0.176) (0.119) (0.168)
Aggregate supply −0.854 −0.955 −0.474 −0.349 −0.398 −0.382 −0.544 −0.596
(0.262) (0.207) (0.182) (0.429) (0.224) (0.448) (0.190) 0.292
Log real minimum wage −0.340 −0.355 −0.145 −0.130 0.098 0.125 0.028 0.043
(0.076) (0.062) (0.049) (0.119) (.054) (0.111) (0.067) (0.087)
Male prime-age unemp rate 0.005 0.011 0.002 −0.001 0.003 0.004 0.000 0.006
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008)
Time 0.040 0.040 0.015 0.010 0.016 0.013 0.028 0.026
(0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.020) (0.011) (0.021) (0.011) (0.013)
Time2/1000 −0.025 −0.021 0.010 0.012 0.000 −0.026 −0.021 −0.016
(0.012) (−0.008) (0.009) (0.020) (0.010) (0.020) (0.012) (0.015)
Observations 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43
R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.926 0.787 0.969 0.839 0.868 0.666 0.647 0.687
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Table 2.8: 100 × Observed and Composition Constant Changes in Overall and Residual
Wage Inequality Measures by Using Counterfactual Decomposition Method
Residual Inequality Overall Inequality
∆ 90/50
1973-1989 1989-2005 1973-2005 1973-1989 1989-2005 1973-2005
Males Observed 5.40 4.23 9.63 10.31 15.40 25.71
1973 X’s 0.64 2.16 2.81 9.51 8.96 18.47
1989 X’s 1.00 2.50 3.49 10.92 10.78 21.71
2005 X’s 1.69 2.22 3.90 9.30 9.19 18.49
Females Observed 7.60 4.11 11.71 11.06 12.97 24.03
1973 X’s 3.60 0.88 4.48 10.82 7.92 18.74
1989 X’s 3.55 2.61 6.16 11.28 10.07 21.35
2005 X’s 4.38 4.04 8.42 10.90 10.62 21.53
∆ 50/10
1973-1989 1989-2005 1973-2005 1973-1989 1989-2005 1973-2005
Males Observed 7.39 −1.67 5.71 7.59 −2.43 5.61
1973 X’s 2.43 −0.37 2.06 10.77 3.93 14.70
1989 X’s 2.72 −0.05 2.67 10.84 3.27 14.11
2005 X’s 3.17 0.50 3.66 11.83 4.30 16.13
Females Observed 8.84 0.02 8.86 13.28 0.39 13.66
1973 X’s 2.15 −1.80 0.35 10.55 5.10 15.65
1989 X’s 2.86 −1.44 1.43 9.81 5.60 15.41
2005 X’s 2.85 −0.22 2.64 9.77 7.11 16.88
∆ 90/10
1973-1989 1989-2005 1973-2005 1973-1989 1989-2005 1973-2005
Males Observed 12.79 2.56 15.34 17.90 12.97 30.87
1973 X’s 3.08 1.79 4.87 20.28 12.89 33.17
1989 X’s 3.72 2.45 6.16 21.76 14.05 35.81
2005 X’s 4.85 2.71 7.57 21.13 13.49 34.62
Females Observed 16.43 4.14 20.57 24.23 13.35 37.69
1973 X’s 5.75 −0.91 4.84 21.37 13.02 34.38
1989 X’s 6.41 1.18 7.59 21.08 15.57 36.75
2005 X’s 7.23 3.82 11.05 20.67 17.74 38.41
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CHAPTER III
The Role of Unionization on the U.S. Wage Inequality
During the Period 1990-2010
3.1 Introduction
Over the last three decades a large number of studies have concentrated on explaining
the widening of wage inequality in the U.S. labor market since the 1980s (see survey by Katz
and Autor 1999). However, in recent years, many studies have found that most of the action
has been at the very top tail of the wage distribution. Stories based on the returns from the
human capital variables and the excess demand of skilled labor are not enough to explain
the increase in wages at the upper tail of the U.S. wage distribution. Different approaches
are needed to explain the rising gap between the upper and lower tails of the U.S. wage
distribution, especially during the period 1990-2010.
Figure 11 depicts the U.S. top 10 percent income share since the 1913. Note that the
top 10 percent income share curve for U.S. is U-shaped. In most recent years, the top 10
percent income shares are around 46 percent. In the past 100 years, this phenomenon has
been only seen right before the ‘Great Depression’ in the early 1930s. Alvaredo et al. (2013)
show that the shape of the income share curves of the top 1 percent in continental Europe
and Japan are much closer to an L-shape rather than a U-shape. This suggests that the U.S.
1Source: World Top Income Database. Income is defined as pre-tax market income; it excludes govern-
ment transfers and nontaxable fringe benefits.
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has experienced higher income inequality compared to the other developed nations since the
last three decades.
In the early 1980s, the overall wage inequality increased throughout the wage distribution.
The right panel of figure 2 shows the lower tail wage inequality (50/10 percentile wage gap)
and upper tail wage inequality (90/50 percentile wage gap) by using the March CPS (Current
Population Survey) data. As shown both the lower tail and upper tail wage inequality have
increased during the 1980s. However, since the 1990s there are two different patterns of
changes in the U.S. wage inequality. The combined male-female upper tail wage inequality
has increased since the 1980s but the lower tail wage inequality has decreased since the 1990s.
This complex pattern of changes in wages is known as the polarization of the U.S. economy.
The left hand panel of figure 2 shows that the 90/10 percentile wage gap has increased
around 20 percent during the period 1980-2012. The 90/10 percentile wage gap has increased
around 10 percent in the early 1980s, then keep falling over the subsequent 10 years. Since
the mid nineties, it has a steady upward trend. Autor et al. (2008), Firpo, Fortin and
Limieux (2011), Alvaredo (2013) among others, show that the driving force of this increase
in the 90/10 percentile wage gap is the substantial change in real wages at the upper tail and
a lack of increases in real wages at the lower tail of the U.S. wage distribution. However, a
question still remains unsolved: why did the 50/10 percentile wage gap fall during the 1990s
and then remain the same during the period 2005-2010? The motivation of this study is to
find out the role of the union to explain this phenomenon. Unions play a very important
role at both the top and bottom tails of the U.S. wage distribution because the U.S. labor
market has gone through huge changes in terms of the union structure since the 1990s.
The behavior of the tails of the U.S. wage distribution is important for explaining the
overall wage inequality because the top 10 percent are most responsible for the steep increase
in the U.S. wage inequality since the 1980s. Alverado et al. (2013) show that apart from the
bubble in 1920s, the U.S. top 1 percent income share is between 15 percent to 20 percent
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till the 1980s and the top 1 percent income share has risen around 135 percent over the
period 1980-2007. There is a fall in the income share during the recession of 2008-2009, but
it rebounded again in 2010. On the other extreme, at the lower tail, workers real income
become stagnant or negative depending on the subgroup of the education levels during the
same period of time.
Figure 3 shows that male and female workers experience slightly different patterns of
changes in wage inequality, especially at the lower tail of the wage distribution over the last
decades. For men, the lower tail wage gap is falling over time, whereas for women, the lower
tail wage gap remains almost constant since the 1990s. The male-female wage gaps also fall
substantially, especially at the upper tail of the wage distribution. Autor et al. (2008) show
that the gender wage gaps at different parts of the wage distribution fall by education and
occupations over the last two decades. These imply that the overall pattern of changes in
wage distribution does not reflect the changes in female wage distribution function over the
period 1990-2010.
Figure 4 shows that there is a sharp fall in male union members compared to females over
the last two decades. The percentage of male union members has fallen from 23 percent to
15 percent whereas the percentage of female union workers has gone down from 15 percent
to 13 percent. Figure 5 shows the composition of male and female union workers with five
different education levels for the three discrete time periods of 1990, 2000 and 2010. In the
left panel, we see that during the 1990s the coverage of female union workers is uniform in
terms of the skill distribution. However, over the last two decades, the union coverage has
concentrated near the top of the skill distribution. Thus, unions decrease the within sector
wage inequality among female workers.
Right panel of figure 5 shows that union coverage tends to be concentrated at the middle
of the skill distribution for males. High school drop outs and high school graduates represent
two thirds of the total union members during the 1990s, whereas their share falls by less than
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half in 2010. These suggest that unionization rates vary across the wage distribution, and
the union membership has fallen disproportionately for low skilled workers. Lewis (1986)
shows that unions raise the wage more for low skilled workers. This implies that unions play
a substantial role in equalizing wages across groups and a sharp fall in unionization at the
lower part of the skill distribution increases the between group wage inequality for the male
workers.
A number of previous studies, including Freeman (1980, 1993), Lemieux (1993), Card
(1996, 2001), DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1997), Machin (1997), Gosling and Lemieux
(2001), Card, Lemieux and Riddell (2003), and Firpo, Forin and Lemieux (2009) have showed
the role of unions in the U.S. wage inequality. Most of these studies have focused on men
over the period 1970-2000. One contribution of this study in the previous literature is to
provide a comprehensive analysis of the contribution of unionization on wage inequality for
both men and women over the last two decades.
This paper proposes a new econometric model, ‘Box-Cox Unconditional Quantile Re-
gression’, to capture the effects of the union more accurately at the two tails of the wage
distribution function. By using this new estimation method we find that unionization can
explain around 20 to 25 percent of the total changes in the lower tail wage inequality and
nothing for the 90/10 percentile wage gap for men over the last two decades. For women,
the impact of unionization on wage inequality is much less than for men. Unionization can
explain around 0.2 percent of total changes in the 90/10 percentile wage gap and has no
effect on the lower tail wage inequality. DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996), Card (2001),
Gosling and Lemieux (2001), and Card, Lemieux and Riddell (2003) all have also concluded
that declining unionization has very little impact on female wage inequality in the U.S. labor
market.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing wage decomposition
methods. In section 3, I propose new econometric model to capture the effects of declining
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unionization at the two tails of the U.S. wage distribution. Section 4 represents the con-
struction of the proposed decomposition method and its theoretical results. In section 5, I
discuss the data and show the empirical results and conclude in section 6. All the derivations
are shown in the appendix section.
3.2 Review of Decomposition Methods
Most of the previous studies used the linear regression framework to estimate the wage
gaps between different parts of the income distribution. The regression model is not the
right framework because if we fix any covariate at its median and plot the distribution of
the dependent variable wage (w) at that given value of the independent variable, we see
that the distribution of w is highly skewed for the U.S. labor market data over the period
1990-2010. This implies that quantile regression is the ideal model to capture the effects of
the covariates at different parts of the wage distribution. The linear regression model can not
capture the effects of the covariates on wage at the different parts of the distribution. The
main advantage of the Oaxaca decomposition method is that it can separate out the price
effect of workers’ characteristics and the composition effect which is defined as the effect on
wage due to changes in the distribution of the workers’ characteristics compared to the base
period. We can also decompose the composition effect by individual covariates (see Rothe
2013).
Over the last fifteen years there have been several papers that have studied decomposition
methods, including Rothe (2012a, 2012b, 2010), Chernozhukov et al. (2012), Firpo et al.
(2011, 2007), Antonczky et al. (2010), Altonji et al. (2008), Melly (2005), Machado and
Mata (2005), Donald et al. (2000), Gosling et al. (2000) and Di-Nardo et al. (1996). (See
also the extensive survey by Fortin, Lemieux, and Fipro (2011) on the wage decomposition
literature.) These papers show how to construct a counterfactual distribution function by
a wide range of parametric, semi-parametric or non-parametric methods. Many of these
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studies use the simulation method to construct the counterfactual distribution function and
that is why those methods are computationally intensive and become practically infeasible
for very large data sets.
Firpo et al. (2007, 2011) use a new estimation technique known as unconditional quantile
regression to estimate the effect of X on the unconditional τth quantile of Y . Firpo, Fortin
and Lemieux (2009) denote this estimated parameter as the partial or marginal effect of
shifting the distribution of a covariate on the unconditional quantile. The unconditional
quantile regression approach has attracted a lot of attention in the econometrics literature
since Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009) introduced the concept.
One important factor behind this interest is that conditional quantiles do not average
up to their unconditional population counterparts. As a result, the estimates obtained by
running a quantile regression can not be used to estimate the impact of X on the corre-
sponding unconditional quantile. This implies that the quantile regression method cannot
find out the impact of marginal increases in all the workers’ education on some features of
the distribution of wage, such as its moments, quantiles, gini coefficient or other measures
of income inequality.
In the Mincer wage equation the dependent variable wage (w) depends on the observable
X and unobservable ε, in the form,
w = h(X, ε) (3.1)
where h is differentiable and strictly monotonic. Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2007, 2011)
assume the linear additive separable model w = X ′β + ε. The linear form of the model
implies that a small change t in covariate Xj simply shifts the location of the distribution of
w by βj.t and leaves all other features of the distribution unchanged.
There is a fundamental problem with applying this method to U.S. wage distribution
data. The model is based on the implicit assumption that conditional expectation of Re-
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centered Influence Function (RIF) is linear in parameters. Barsky et al. (2002) point out
that when the true conditional expectation function is not linear, the decomposition based
on a linear regression is biased. In particular, this assumption does not hold for a highly
skewed U.S. wage distribution data.
Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2011) suggest using a re-weighting procedure to solve this
problem as described in Di-Nardo et al. (1996). However, the re-weighting procedure be-
comes practically infeasible when there are too many continuous variables. Moreover, re-
weighting can have some undesirable properties in small samples when there is a problem
of common support. Frolich (2004) finds that re-weighting estimators perform poorly in
this context. Autor et al. (2008) mention that the validity of the re-weighting counterfac-
tual analysis depends on the partial equilibrium assumption that price and quantities are
independent in the labor market. This assumption is economically invalid.
3.3 Econometric Model
In this paper, I provide an alternative solution to this problem by using a flexible Box-Cox
transformation to equation (1), we can rewrite the equation (1) as
w? = h̃(X ′βτ , λτ , ε) (3.2)
In equation(2), it is assumed that h̃ is strictly monotonically increasing in X ′βτ and also
depends on the shape parameter λτ . Moreover, w
? > 0, x ∈ Rk are observed, while the
parameter βτ ∈ B and λτ ∈ R are unknown and τ ∈ (0, 1). h̃ is given by
w? =

(wλτ − 1)/λτ if λτ 6= 0
log(w) if λτ = 0,
(3.3)
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assuming λ ∈ [λ, λ̄] to be a finite closed interval. The advantage of using the Box-Cox
transformation is that the shape parameter λτ adjusts with each quantile to capture the
precise shape of the conditional expectation function of w?.
3.3.1 Model Set Up
The Mincer equation is the most widely used specification of the empirical earnings
equation in the labor economics literature. This equation is typically specified in the linear
functional form,
w = α + β1 union+X
′β + ε (3.4)
In this analysis, unionization is the key interest variable where union status is a binary
variable representing whether a worker is a union member or not. X represents the set of
control variables consisting of education, experience, race, gender and other sets of demo-
graphic dummy variables.
Buchnisky (1998) mentions that to calculate the potential female work experience, we
need to take into account that females can leave the labor market a for short period of
time due to home activities related to child birth. We follow Buchnisky’s (1998) method to
estimate the adjusted female work experience,
Yp = γ1xp+γ2x
2
p+δ1xp×chld+δ2x2p×chld = γ1xp
(
1− δ1
γ1
chld
)
+γ2x
2
p
(
1− δ2
γ2
chld
)
(3.5)
where xp denotes potential experience
2 and chld is the number of children in the family.
The dependent variable (Yp) in this equation is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if
a woman works for pay, and zero, otherwise.
2potetial experience = Age - 6 - years of schooling
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The other independent variables include: family composition by age, children by age
groups, personal non-earned income, other family income (excluding personal income), ed-
ucation, number of children in the family, dummy variables for race, metropolitan area,
and marital status. The term
(
1− δ1
γ1
chld
)
is the adjustment factor we need to consider to
potential experience in order to obtain the actual experience, the variable of interest. The
adjustment term x2p be
(
1− δ2
γ2
chld
)
allows more flexible approximation of the dependent
variable Yp.
3.3.2 Model Identification
Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009) defined ‘Unconditional Partial Effects’ as the small
location shift in the distribution of a continuous variable X on the distributional statistic
ν(FY ),
UQPE(ν) = lim
t→0
ν(F ?Y,t)− ν(FY )
t
(3.6)
where ν(F ?Y,t) =
∫
FY |X(y|x).dFX(x − t) and FY |X(.) is continuous and smooth function.
Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009) show that any distributional statistic ν(Fy) can be ex-
pressed in terms of the conditional expectation of the Re-centered Influence Function (RIF (y; ν, FY ))
given X:
ν(FY ) =
∫
E[RIF (y; ν, FY )|X = x].dFX(x) (3.7)
where RIF (y; qτ ) = qτ +
τ−I{y≤qτ}
fy(qτ )
and qτ is the τth sample quantile. The above results show
that when we are interested in the impact of covariates on a specific distributional statistic
ν(FY ) such as the quantile, we simply need to integrate over E[RIF (y; ν, FY )|X = x].
Proposition 13: Assuming that the structural form Y = h(X, ε) is strictly monotonic in ε
and X and ε are independent, then the parameter UQPE(τ) is:
3The proof of this proposition is available in the appendix
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UQPE(τ) = βτj (1 + λτqτ )
(1−λτ )/λτ (3.8)
Note that for the linear model λτ = 1 and the UQPE(τ) becomes β
τ
j as shown by Firpo,
Fortin and Lemieux (2009).
The proposition 1 result is a generalization of Firpo et al.’s (2009) linear model because
the linear model is a special case of Box-Cox model. This result can not be derived without
the independence assumption between X and ε. In many practical cases this assumption may
not be satisfied. To identify the model, we then use the control variable approach introduced
by Imbens and Newey (2009). Ghosh (2013) shows a generalization of this result by using
the control variable approach introduced by Imbens and Newey (2009) in the presence of
endogenous regressors in the model.
Firpo et al. (2009) also show that the unconditional quantile regression function, mτ (X) =
E[RIF (.)|X] can be used to consistently estimate the effects of X on the unconditional τth
quantile of w. By using the above result we can consistently estimate the unconditional
quantile regression function (mτ ) by the following result.
Proposition 2: Given that the conditional expectation function of RIF (.) exists and X
and ε are independent, the Box-Cox unconditional quantile regression function is given by:
mτ = X
′βτ (1 + λτqτ )
(λτ−1)/λτ
Again, note that for the linear model, λτ equals to 1 and the mτ becomes X
′βτj as shown
by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009). The above result can be easily derived from proposition
1 as long as the independence assumption between X and ε holds. If the assumption does not
hold, mτ can be identified by using the control variable method as shown in Ghosh (2013).
We define θτ = (βτ λτ )
′. The convergence of θ̂τ is guaranteed since the objective function
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is convex. By following the similar approach as shown by Firpo et al. (2009), one can easily
show that θ̂τ converges to θτ asymptotically.
To estimate UQPE and mτ , I need to estimate three parameters. The usual τth sample
quantile which can be represented as in Koenker and Bassett (1978), as
q̂τ = argmin
qτ
n∑
i=1
(τ − I{wi − qτ ≤ 0})(wi − qτ )
and we estimate β̂τ and λ̂τ by using nonlinear least square, which is given by
θ̂τ = argmin

n∑
i=1
(
(1 + λτRIFi)
1/λτ − x′iβτ
)2
for λτ 6= 0
n∑
i=1
(exp{RIFi} − x′iβτ )
2 for λτ = 0,
(3.9)
where θτ = (βτ λτ )
′.
3.3.3 Markup Factor
We define the markup factor as MFτ = (1+λτqτ )
(λτ−1)/λτ since in both the propositions,
this is the additional term we multiply compared to the linear RIF regression4 model results
derived by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009). This markup factor varies over each quantile
through the values of λτ and qτ . The advantage of the Box-Cox model is that when the
conditional expectation function is non-linear, the shape parameter (λτ ) in the Box-Cox
model adjusts with each quantile through the non-linear least square optimization.
Figure 6 shows the three dimensional plot of the markup factor where the first two axes
are λτ and qτ . The ranges of the axes are taken from the empirical analysis since we are
interested on the behavior of the markup factor in our data. The ranges of the markup
factor varies on different sets of values of qτ and λτ . Figure 6 shows that the markup factor
4Re-centered influence function for quantile is defined as RIF (w, qτ ) = qτ + (τ − I{w ≤ qτ})/fw(qτ )
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surface is monotonically increasing in λτ for any given value of qτ . When λτ equals to 1, the
markup factor also becomes 1 for all values of qτ and we get a straight line in the upward
sloping surface. This implies that we have two different regions in the markup factor surface
which is divided by the straight line, one for λτ less than 1 and one where λτ is greater than
1.
The markup factor is less than 1 when λτ is less than 1 for all values of qτ . If we use
the linear RIF regression model when λτ is less than 1 then we overestimate UQPE and
mτ because we multiply βτ by a bigger number than the true value which is less than 1.
Similarly when λτ is greater than 1, we underestimate UQPE and mτ . By comparing with
the Box-Cox model, we see that at the upper tail of the wage distribution function, the linear
unconditional quantile regression model underestimates the unconditional partial effects and
RIF regression functions around 5 to 8 percent whereas at the lower tail, it overestimates
around 2 to 4 percent for these specific set of values of qτ and λτ .
3.3.4 Decomposition of Changes in Wage Distribution
In this subsection, we show how to formally decompose the changes of the wage distribu-
tion function into composition effect and wage structure effect by using the non-linear RIF
regression approach as shown above. As is well known, the standard regression analysis can
be used to perform a Oxaca-Blinder decomposition for the mean of a distribution. RIF re-
gression allow us to perform the same kind of decomposition for any distributional statistics
for the distribution function.
Let’s consider two time periods, t = 0 and t = 1. In general, any distributional parameter
can be written as a functional ν(Fw). Denote ∆ν be the overall change in the distributional
statistics ν, then we have,
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∆ν = ν(FW1|t=1)− ν(FW0|t=0)
=
[
ν(FW1|t=1)− ν(FW0|t=1)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Composition Effect
+
[
ν(FW0|t=1)− ν(FW0|t=0)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Wage Structure Effect
+ Residual (3.10)
where the first bracketed terms represent the effect of changes in the distribution of covariates,
which is denoted as the composition effect. The terms in the second bracket represent the
effect of changes in the market returns of the covariates, which we denote as the wage
structure effect. The rest is called the residual effect. We note that the key factor of this
decomposition is to construct the counterfactual distributional statistics ν(FW0|T=1). This
term represents the distributional statistics of the counterfactual distribution function where
the covariates are distributed as in period t = 0 but the workers are paid according to period
t = 1.
We denote ∆CEν and ∆
WE
ν as the composition effect and wage structure effect respectively.
By applying Firpo et al.’s (2009) result, any distributional statistics can be expressed in
terms of the expectation of the conditional Re-centered Influence Function. We can rewrite
the composition and wage structure effect as,
∆CEν = E[m
ν
t=1]− E[mνc ]
∆WEν = E[m
ν
c ]− E[mνt=0]
where, E[mνt=1] = X
′
tβ
t
τ (1 + λ
t
τqτ )
(1−λtτ )/λtτ ; t = 0, 1
and E[mνc ] = X
′
tβ
t=0
τ (1 + λ
t=1
τ qτ )
(1−λtτ )/λtτ
To obtain the impact of any distributional statistics of a given individual covariate (x̃t),
we need to construct distributional statistics of another counterfactual distribution function,
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such that the distribution of all the covariates remain same as in period 1 and only (x̃t) is
distributed as in period 0. Then we get,
ν(x̃t) = ν(F (wt=1))− ν(F (wt=1;x′t=1, xt=0))
where xt = [x̃t x
′
t] and x
′
t is the matrix consists of all the other covariates except x̃t. The
counterfactual distributional statistics ν(F (wt=1;x
′
t=1, xt=0)) can be obtained from ν(F (wt=1;xt=0))
by using the method described above.
3.3.5 Construction of Distributional Statistics
To construct the distributional statistics, we follow the following steps:
1. Fix the set of specific values of the quantiles τ where τ ∈ (0, 1).
2. For each τ ∈ (0, 1), estimate q̂τ by using the linear quantile regression and estimate fw(q̂τ )
by using a kernel density estimator.
3. Estimate β̂τ and λ̂τ by using the non-linear least square.
4. Draw random samples from X for n times and estimate:
{m̂t}ni=1 = X
′β̂τ (1 + λ̂τ q̂τ )
(̂λτ−1)/λ̂τ
5. Estimate the distributional statistics:
ν̂t = E[m̂t]
There is a close connection between RIF regression and the distributional regression
approach of Chernozhukov et al. (2012). In both cases, regression models are estimated
for explaining the determinants of the proportion of workers earning less than a certain
wage. Suppose that after estimating a model for proportions, we compute a counterfactual
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proportion based on the return to the covariate estimated with the Linear Probability Model
as proposed by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009), then we obtain very similar results.
3.4 Data and Results
In this paper I have used Current Population Survey (CPS) data. CPS contains income
and all the necessary demographic variables of individual workers. The data are drawn
5 percent self-weighted 1980-2010 samples, all from the Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG)
Supplements of the Current Population Survey. The data consist of U.S.-born black and
white men and women, aged 18-65, with positive annual earnings and hours worked in the
year preceding the census and a nonzero sampling weight. The wage measure used is an
hourly wage measure computed by dividing earnings by hours of work for workers not paid
by the hour. For workers paid by the hour, we use a direct measure of the hourly wage
rate. CPS weights are used throughout the empirical analysis. Annual income is expressed
in 2010 dollars using the ‘Personal Consumption Expenditures’ price index.
In the data analysis, w is the real log hourly wage. The regressors consist of years of
schooling, potential experience and experience square, union coverage, interaction terms of
schooling and experience. I also include controls for marital status, race, and statistical
metropolitan area in all the estimated models. Consistent with Autor et al. (2006) and
Firpo et al. (2011), figure 7 shows that during the 1990s, changes in real wages at each
quantile of the wage distribution follow a U-shaped curve. In the left panel we plot the same
changes in wage during the period 2000-2010.
Figure 7 illustrates that wage changes in the top half of the distribution are quite similar
for men and women during 1990-2010. Wages at the top have increased much compared to
the middle part of the distribution function, resulting in top-end inequality. By contrast,
inequality in the lower half of the distribution decreased rapidly during the 1990s since wages
at the bottom grew substantially more than those in the middle of the distribution.
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Table 1 represents the summary statistics of the male and female combined data. The
CPS is a large nationally representative sample of the entire labor force. The income and
worker’s demographic variables in the samples represent the population of the U.S. labor
force. The sample sizes are 69,651; 59,750 and, 84,239 for the years 1990, 2000 and 2010
respectively. Table 2 represents the summary statistics for men and women separately.
Table 3 shows unionization rates and percentage of union wage gaps between union
and non-union workers across the five different education groups for men and women in
1990-2010. A key feature of the table is how union membership rates change over time
across the five education groups. In 1990, high school dropouts and high school graduates
represent two thirds of the total union members for men. This pattern of concentration of
the union membership has changed in 2010 and become more evenly distributed across the
skill distribution. Among women, unionization rates have concentrated more on the skilled
workers in the 1990s and this pattern has become even stronger in the preceding twenty
years.
Another interesting feature is the changes in the pattern of the union wage gaps across
the five education groups. For men in 1990, the wage gaps ranged from 35 percent for the
lowest skilled workers to 2 percent for the highest skilled workers. These estimates imply
that unions have played an important role in reducing the wage inequality across the groups
during the 1990s. These effects have increased substantially during the next two decades.
The union wage gap for men of the lowest skill group is 57 percent and -17 percent for
the most skilled workers in 2010. For women, the percentages of college graduate and post
college graduate union workers have increased approximately 1 percent and 0.27 percent
respectively, whereas the percentage of union wage gaps have decreased around 0.1 percent
and 17 percent respectively, during the period 1990-2010.
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3.4.1 Changes in the U.S. Wage Distribution Function
In Table 4 shows that the changes in the unconditional wage distribution for male and
female workers by using the proposed Box-Cox RIF Regression model. The numbers in the
parentheses represent the 95 percent bootstrap confidence interval which has been generated
by 1000 replications. The first three columns show the real log hourly wage from the year
1990-2010 based on the 2010 consumer price index. The fifth and sixth columns represent the
percentage change in real wage during the period 2000-2010 and 2000-1990. I also calculate
the Gini coefficients and its changes over the period.
In the top and bottom panel of the fifth column in Table 4, we see that during the period
1990-2000, the estimated changes in real wages for men are around 0.06 to 3 percent while
for women, the changes are around 5 to 10 percent. This is consistent with the findings that
during the 1990s, gender gap reduces sharply. However, from the first three columns we
see that the absolute wages for female workers are considerably lower compared to the male
throughout the wage distribution. These suggest that gender inequality is still very high in
the U.S. labor market.
During the period 2000-2010, changes in the real wages at the lower tail of the wage
distribution for both men and women are similar but, at the median and 75th to 90th quan-
tile, women have experienced slightly higher changes in real wages than men. However, the
difference in changes of the female-male wage gap at the upper tail of the wage distribution
is much smaller compared to the same difference in the 1990s.
By taking the difference of first and fifth columns of the first and fifth rows in the top
and bottom panel of table 4, we see that over the last two decades the 90/10 percentile wage
gap has increased for men around 10 percent and for women around 11 percent. Most of the
changes have occurred during the 2000s. The changes of the Gini coefficients also suggest
that wage inequality has increased more both for men and women during the 2000s compared
to the 1990s. Figure 7 summarizes these changes by plotting the percentage changes in real
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wages for each quantile over the period 1990-2010.
3.4.2 Counterfactual Analysis
In Table 5, the wage distribution function has been decomposed into three parts, namely
the composition effect, wage structure effect and residual effect. The residual effect is defined
as the unexplained part of the change in the wage distribution as shown in Table 2. Row by
row, I report the estimates of these three effects for different quantiles and various inequality
measures. We note that for men at the lower tail of the wage distribution both composition
effect and wage structure effect have almost no impacts on wage. As a result, we see there
are not much changes in wages at the lower tail of the wage distribution. For women, changes
in wages at the lower tail are positive because both composition effects and wage structure
effects are greater than zero.
During both the periods, 1990-2000 and 2000-2010, and for both men and women at
the upper tail of the wage distribution, the wage structure effect dominates the composition
effect. These findings suggest that, at the upper tail of the wage distribution, the market
returns of the high skilled workers’ skills have increased significantly compared to the effects
due to changes in the composition of the labor force during the period 1990-2010. During
the 1980s, wage inequality in the U.S. labor market increased substantially, largely due to
the changes in the education and experience composition of the labor force. However, during
the period 1990-2010, the primary source of changes in the wage distribution is the wage
structure effect. The composition effect plays a very minor role.
Figure 8 represents the decomposition results of the U.S. wage distribution function for
men and women during the period 1990-2010. In the left side top and bottom panels, we
show the composition effects for the sub-periods 1990-2000 and 2000-2010. We see that the
composition curve is very flat and close to zero at the lower tail and around the median
it goes to below zero for men. For women, the composition effects contribute around 0 to
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2 percent of total changes in the wages throughout the wage distribution function for the
period 1990-2000. In the top left panel, we see that the composition effects are around 0 to
1 percent whereas for women the effects are 1 to 2 percent during the period 1990-2010.
The right hand side panels of figure 8 show the wage structure effects for men and women.
We note that during the 1990s, the wage structure effects of men around the median are
less than zero which makes the total effects negative. Apart from the median, all other
quantiles, effects are positive. This is still a puzzle for the labor economists: why is the
skill prices of the median income earners lower compared to the workers at the lower tail of
the wage distribution? During the period 2000-2010, the patterns of wage structure for men
and women are very similar and increases sharply at the upper tail of the wage distribution.
Wage structure effect is the dominating force of the total changes of the wage distribution
function over the period 1990-2010.
This pattern of changes in the U.S. wage distribution in the 1990s differs sharply compared
to the 1980s, with more rapid growth of real wages at the top of the wage distribution
relative to the middle and the bottom of the wage distribution. Goos and Manning (2007)
and Autor, Katz and Kearney (2005) characterize this pattern as the polarization of the U.S.
labor market because the median income earners are pushed towards to the left tail of the
U.S. wage distribution.
3.4.3 Effects of Unionization
Table 6 shows the unconditional partial effects of unionization at different quantiles for
men and women over the period 1990-2010. A key feature of the table is the pattern of
the Unconditional Quantile Partial Effect (UQPE) across the qunatiles for both men and
women. For men in 1990, these ranged from 18.76 percent at the lower tail to 4.5 percent
at the upper tail of the wage distribution. The UQPE coefficent 0.1876 implies that one
percentage point increase of the proportion of union members at the 10th quantile leads to
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18.76 percent increase in wage of all the workers at that quantile. The advantage of uncon-
ditional quantile regression over the conditional quantile regression is that the conditional
quantile regression estimates only the ‘within effect’5 of unionization, whereas the uncondi-
tional quantile regression estimates both the ‘within’ and ‘between effect’. The UQPEs at
the 10th and 25th quantile have increased around 3 to 4 percent, while at the median, it has
decreased approximately 1 percent over the last twenty years.
For women, the UQPE at the lower tail has fallen approximately 2 percent at the 10th
quantile and around 5 to 6 percent at the 25th and 50th quantile during the same period.
Table 3 shows that the percentage of the high school graduate union workers has decreased
from 5.82 to 2.65 percent. The percentages of the college graduate and post college graduate
union workers have increased over time leading to more concentration of the union workers
at the upper tail of the skill distribution during the last twenty years. As a result, the
collective bargaining power of unions for the high school graduate workers has declined over
time, leading to fall in average wage gaps between union and nonunion workers around the
median during the last two decades.
An important caveat to the interpretation of the UQPE of union status in table 6 is
the potential difference between the unobserved heterogeneity of the union and nonunion
workers at the upper and lower tail of the wage distribution. Card (2001) shows that if we
don’t take into account the unobserved heterogeneity, then the estimated marginal effect of
union is the true effect plus the self selection effect due to the unobserved skills of union
members versus non union workers in the same observed skill group. Card (1996) shows
that low skilled workers have higher unobserved skills than their non-union counterparts,
contributing to their higher wages. Conversely, high skilled members have below average
unobserved skills compared to the non-union workers, explaining the negative wage gap.
5Linear conditional quantile regression estimates the effects of unionization only for union workers by
using βQR = F
−1
w (τ |union = 1) − F−1w (τ |union = 0) whereas unconditional quantile regression estimates
the effects of unionization for both union and nonunion workers by using dqτdp = (Pr[w > qτ |union =
1]− Pr[w > qτ |union = 0)/fw(qτ ) where p is the proportion of union workers at the τth quantile and qτ is
the τth population quantile of w.
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These previous findings suggest that ignoring the unobserved heterogeneity leads to bi-
ased UQPE estimates of unionization for low skilled workers and high skilled workers. In
particular, UQPE coefficients have downward bias for the low skilled workers and upward
bias for the high skilled workers. This can explain why the unconditional partial effects of
unionization at the 90th quantile is negative for both men and women during the period
1990-2010. Firpo et al. (2009) have used the RIF-OLS, RIF-Logit and RIF-NP models to
estimate the effects of unionization on the CPS 1983-1985 outgoing rotation group data and
found that the unconditional partial effects are negative at the upper tail of the wage dis-
tribution. The negative coefficients of the UQPE at the upper tail of the wage distribution
are the self selection effect of the high skilled union workers.
To address this issue of unobserved heterogeneity, I follow the approach proposed by
DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) to decompose the entire wage distribution function by
using the Oaxaca decomposition method. The basic idea of this approach is to construct a
counterfactual wage distribution function such that all the other workers’ characteristics are
distributed as in the current period and the distribution of the union workers remains the
same as in the previous period. Now subtracting the conterfactual distribution function from
the current period distribution function gives us the effects of unionization at different parts
of the wage distribution. This is because the only difference between the two distribution
functions is the union status of the workers.
The decomposition method takes care of the unobserved heterogeneity between union
and non-union workers if we assume that workers in the same income group have similar
unobserved heterogeneity. This decomposition method can only compare similar types of
workers from the actual and counterfactual wage distribution. There is another implicit
assumption we need to make to use this decomposition method: there is no structural shift
of the union structure between the the two time periods. If this assumption does not satisfy,
then the unobserved heterogeneity of the union workers in the same group differs in the
actual and counterfactual distribution. One of the limitations of this paper is that this
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study does not take into account the role of some potential unobserved factors that cause
the changes in the unionization. In fact, this limitation is sustained in the unionization
literature. The objective of this study is not to explain what causes unionization, but rather
to explain the fall in 50/10 percentile wage gap in the U.S. labor market, given the decline
in the unionization over the last two decades.
Card et al. (2003) assume the price of the unobserved skills are not changing over time
to find the effect of unionization. To explain the residual wage inequality, Lemieux (2006)
assume that the distribution of the unobserved characteristics of the workers is not changing
over time. Another way researchers have handled this unobserved heterogeneity problem is
by using panel data. Card (1996) and Lemieux (1998) among many others have followed
that approach. Panel data estimates of the union wage premium take into account the
unobserved heterogeneity by differencing out the time invariant effect on wage. The implicit
assumption is that all the unobserved heterogeneities are time invariant. These estimates
have measurement error problems and the decomposition method also uses a less restrictive
assumption compared to the panel data estimators.
Table 7 represents the effects of unions for men and women over the period 1990-2010 by
using the Oaxaca decomposition method. The effects of unionization for men on the 50/10
percentile wage gap is 1.78 percent during the period 1990-2010. This means that in 2010,
if union structure remains as in 1990 and everything else remains the same, then the 50/10
percentile wage gap would have 1.78 percent more compared to 2010. This implies that
declining unionization can explain the 1.78 percent fall in 50/10 percentile wage gap during
the period 1990-2010.
As shown in table 4, during the period 1990-2010, the total number of union members
has fallen from 22.99 percent to 15.23 percent and the percentage of the high school graduate
union members has fallen from 10.84 percent to 5.37 percent. Combining the high school
graduates and workers with some college education contributes around 70 percent of the
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total fall in unionization over the period 1990-2010. These groups of union workers belong
to the middle of the wage distribution. Declining unionization implies that these group of
workers’ wage falls sharply because as shown in table 6, the marginal effects of union around
the median of the wage distribution are 20-23 percent over the period 1990-2010. As a result,
the overall wages around the median fall and there is not much change in the wage at the
lower tail since unionization has not changed much at the lower tail, compared to the changes
in the middle of wage distribution. Combining these two facts leads to a 1.78 percent fall in
the 50/10 percentile wage gap during the period 1990-2010.
Figure 7 demonstrates this fact by showing the percentage changes in wages for male
and female separately over the period 1990-2010. The left panel shows the changes of wages
from the 5th to 95th quantile during the period 2000-2010. Table 3 shows that during the
period 1990-2010, the percentage of male high school graduate union workers drops from
10.84 percent to 7.42 percent, and in the right panel of figure 7 we see that the real wages
around the median are negative and lower than the wages around the 10th quantile.
During the period 2000-2010, the percentage of male high school graduate union workers
again falls from 7.42 to 5.37 percent and the left panel of figure 7 shows the percentage
changes in wages around the median are lower compared to the wages at the lower tail of
the wage distribution function. The continuous fall of the fraction of the union members
around the median also implies that over time, unions have less collective bargaining power
for those workers who are at the middle of the wage distribution which is why the Box-Cox
unconditional quantile regression partial effects fall from 22.95 percent to 21.97 percent over
the period 1990-2010.
For women, unions have almost no effect throughout the wage distribution function.
Unionization can explain less than 0.2 percent for both the 50/10 percentile and the 90/50
percentile wage gaps over the period 1990-2010. This is because the changes in the female
workers unionization rates are very small and the concentration of union members is at
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the upper parts of the skill distribution function. Lewis (1986) shows that unions have less
bargaining power at the upper tail compared to the rest of the parts of the wage distribution.
As a result, the gaps in the overall wage dispersion between union and non-union workers
are much smaller for women than men.
3.5 Conclusion
The sources of the asymmetric changes in the U.S. wage distribution with a steady rise
in the upper-tail and a stagnation in the lower-tail during the 1990s still remain unresolved.
Autor et al. (2008) show that hypotheses, such as falling minimum wages, declining union-
ization, and skill biased technological change, fail to fully explain the upper-tail inequality
paired with declining lower-tail inequality. Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2013)
show that top tax rates and top pre-tax income share have very high negative correlation
over the last 100 years.
Katz and Murphy (1992) and Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998) propose an explanation
based on relative demand growth for high skilled workers and fluctuations in relative skill
supplies based on canonical supply- demand models. Stories based on return from the human
capital variables and demand for skilled labor cannot explain why median income earners
are doing worse compared to the workers at the bottom tail of the wage distribution because
median income earners have higher levels of human capital variables and skills. Goldin and
Katz (2008) show that skilled biased technological change continually increases the demand
for high skilled workers. The excess demand for high skilled labor increases the earning gap
between the top and bottom tails of the income distribution. Technological changes are
measured by changes in the prices of cognitive and non-cognitive skills. This can explain
why the 90/50 percentile wage gap is increasing but not why the 50/10 percentile wage gap
is falling over time.
The primary objective of this paper is to find out the role of unionization for the changes
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in the 50/10 percentile and the 90/50 percentile wage gaps for men and women from 1990-
2010. I have two main findings on these issues. First, the decline in union membership among
men explains around 1.78 percent of the total 8 percent changes in the 50/10 percentile wage
gap and does not have much impact on the total 10 percent increases in the 90/50 percentile
wage gap over the period 1990-2010. Second, since the fraction of women union members is
relatively stable over the last two decades, unionization has no impact on the rise in overall
wage inequality.
A secondary goal of this paper is to develop a better understanding of the behavior of the
tails of the wage distribution. We show that the decomposition method based on the Linear
Quantile Regresion method as proposed by Machoda and Mata (2005) and also the Linear
Unconditional Quantile Regression method developed by Firpo, Fortin and Limieux (2009)
underestimates the changes in wage at the upper tail of the U.S. wage distribution function.
The paper proposes a new estimation method known as ‘Box-Cox Unconditional Quantile
Regression’ to solve this problem. The proposed model is a generalization of the linear
unconditional quantile regression and a specific class of non-linear unconditional quantile
regression model proposed by Firpo et al. (2009).
Card, Limieux and Riddell (2003) find that unionization can explain around two thirds
of the U.S. wage inequality since the early 1980s. My estimates suggest that unionization
can explain around 20 to 25 percent of the changes in the lower tail wage inequality and
does not have much impact on the upward trend of the 90/50 percentile wage gap over the
last two decades. Both of these studies have used different ranges of the U.S. labor market
data. However, the estimated impacts of unionization are significantly different. This paper
claims that unionization plays a very important role for the changes in U.S. wage inequality
over the last two decades, but some other factors like international trade, job offshorability
etc. also play crucial roles to explain the downward trend of the lower tail wage inequality.
Unionization is then not the dominating factor behind the changes in the U.S. wage inequality
as suggested by Card et al. (2003).
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
In the Box-Cox model, a small change in t in a covariate Xj corresponds not only a simple
location shift of the distribution Y , but also it captures of the effect on the other distribu-
tional features. For the sake of simplicity, assume that ε follows a distribution Fε. Then the
resulting probability response model is,
Pr[Yλ > qτ |X = x] = Pr
[
(X ′βτ + ε)
λ − 1
λ
> qτ |X = x
]
= Pr
[
ε > (1 + λqτ )
1/λ −X ′βτ |X = x
]
= Pr
[
ε > (1 + λqτ )
1/λ −X ′βτ |X = x
]
= 1− Fε
[
(1 + λqτ )
1/λ −X ′βτ |X = x
]
Thus if ε was normally distributed, the probability response model would be a standard
probit model. Taking derivative with respect to X yields,
dPr[Yλ > qτ |X = x]
dX
= βτ × fε
(
(1 + λqτ )
1/λ −X ′βτ )
)
where fε(.) as the density of ε and the marginal effects are obtained by integrating over the
distribution of X. The average marginal effect is
∫
dPr[Yλ > qτ |X = x]
dX
dFX(x) = βτ
∫
fε
(
(1 + λqτ )
1/λ −X ′βτ )
)
dFX(x)
We can rewrite fY (qτ ) as,
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fY (qτ ) =
d
dqτ
(FY (qτ ))
=
d
dqτ
[Y ≤ qτ (x)]
=
dE
dqτ
[
Pr(
(X ′βτ + ε)
λ
τ − 1
λτ
≤ q | X = x)
]
=
dE
dqτ
[
Pr(ε ≤ (1 + λqτ )1/λτ −X ′βτ | X = x)
]
=
dE
dqτ
[
Fε
(
(1 + λτqτ )
1/λτ −X ′βτ
)]
= E
[
fε(.)×
1
λτ
(1 + λτqτ )
(1/λτ )−1 × λτ
]
=
(
(1 + λτqτ )
(1−λτ )/λτ
)
E
[
fε
(
(1 + λτqτ )
1/λτ −X ′βτ
)]
=
(
(1 + λτqτ )
(1−λτ )/λτ
) ∫
fε
(
(1 + λτqτ )
1/λτ −X ′βτ
)
dFX(x)
The Unconditional Quantile Partial Effect for the Box-Cox model is given by,
UQPE =
βτ
∫
fε
(
(1 + λqτ )
1/λ −X ′βτ )
)
dFX(x)
((1 + λτqτ )(1−λτ )/λτ )
∫
fε ((1 + λτqτ )1/λτ −X ′βτ ) dFX(x)
= βτ (1 + λτqτ )
(λτ−1)/λτ
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Proof of Proposition 2
Again Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009) show that there exists a close relation between the
unconditional partial effects (αFY ) and RIF regression function mτ . This can be represented
as,
E
[
dE[RIF (y, qτ )|X = x]
dx
]
= αFY (X = x, qτ )
⇒
∫
dE[RIF (y, qτ )|X = x]
dx
dFX = βτ (1 + λτqτ )
(1−λτ )/λτ
we substitute RIF regression function mτ = E[RIF (y, qτ )|X = x] in the above relation and
get,
∫
dmτ
dx
dFX = βτ (1 + λτqτ )
(1−λτ )/λτ
⇒
∫
dmτ
∫
dFX =
∫
βτ (1 + λτqτ )
(1−λτ )/λτdX
⇒ mτ = X ′βτ (1 + λτqτ )(λτ−1)/λτ
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Graphs and Tables
Figure 3.1: Top 10 Percent Income Share in the United States from 1913-2012
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Figure 2 : 90/10, 90/50 and 50/10 Percentile Wage Gap in the Period 1975-2012
Figure 3.2: 90/10, 90/50 and 50/10 Percentile Wage Gap in the Period 1975-2012
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Figure 3.3: 90/50 and 50/10 Male Female Percentile Wage Gap over the Period 1990-2012
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Figure 3.4: Percentage of Male Female Union Workers over the Period 1990-2012
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Figure 3.5: Decomposition of Male and Female Union Workers by Education
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Figure 3.6: Plot of the Markup Factor (1 + λτqτ )
(λτ−1)/λτ
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Figure 3.7: Changes in the Unconditional Male and Female Wage Distribution from 1990-
2010
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Figure 3.8: Decomposition of Male Female Wage Distribution Function for the Period 1990-
2010
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Figure 3.9: Unconditional Partial Effects of Union for the Period 1990-2010
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of Current Population Survey Data for All
Variable Year 2010 Year 2000 Year 1990
No of Obs 84, 239 59, 750 69, 651
Male 51.35% 51.89% 52.61%
Union 14.18% 16.33% 19.58%
Black 12.06% 9.96% 9.40%
Married 61.79% 61.41% 63.39%
Urban 75.05% 75.11% 72.50%
Skilled Lab 30.89% 25.73% 22.62%
Schooling (Avg) 13.6973 13.2727 13.0485
Experience(Avg) 20.6494 19.5379 18.0073
Hourly Log Wage (Avg) 2.8277 2.7812 2.7477
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics (Mean and Standard Deviation) of Current Population Survey
Data for Male and Female
Male Female
Variable Stats 2010 2000 1990 2010 2000 1990
Union Mean 0.1513 0.1867 0.2300 0.1324 0.1389 0.1590
SD 0.3584 0.3897 0.4208 0.3390 0.3459 0.3657
Black Mean 0.1043 0.0857 0.0821 0.1379 0.1147 0.1072
SD 0.3056 0.2800 0.2745 0.3448 0.3186 0.3094
Married Mean 0.6421 0.6332 0.6536 0.5924 0.5935 0.6120
SD 0.4794 0.4819 0.4758 0.4914 0.4912 0.4873
Urban Mean 0.7542 0.7528 0.7283 0.7468 0.7493 0.7215
SD 0.4306 0.4314 0.4449 0.4348 0.4334 0.4483
Education Mean 13.5185 13.1745 13.0246 13.8863 13.3787 13.0751
SD 2.9222 3.0590 3.0600 2.6735 2.6765 2.6363
Age Mean 40.3410 38.7596 37.1964 40.3529 38.8658 36.8999
SD 12.2458 11.9745 12.1274 12.2638 11.9323 12.0129
Experience Mean 20.8226 19.5851 18.1718 20.4666 19.4870 17.8248
SD 12.1789 11.9360 12.3512 12.3851 12.0782 12.3711
Log Wage Mean 2.9423 2.9074 2.8993 2.7068 2.6453 2.5796
(Hourly) SD 0.7430 0.7080 0.6756 0.6961 0.6701 0.6259
No of Obs 43, 263 31, 009 36, 645 40, 976 28, 741 33, 006
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Table 3.3: Composition of Union Workers by Education Level and Percentage Wage Gap
between Union and Non-union Workers
Male Female
Education 2010 2000 1990 2010 2000 1990
HS Dropout
Union Workers(%) 0.7189 1.3110 3.1544 0.2055 0.5693 1.2449
Wage Gap (%) 57.0626 37.4755 35.2199 10.2920 29.9023 29.5490
HS Grad
Union Workers(%) 5.3748 7.4237 10.8416 2.6554 3.8992 5.8242
Wage Gap (%) 28.0074 27.5904 33.4475 20.2451 17.8301 24.2174
Some College
Union Workers(%) 4.7415 5.8669 4.7978 2.9638 3.4334 2.7332
Wage Gap (%) 30.8344 27.1019 29.4737 19.2739 17.9106 27.6953
College Grad
Union Workers(%) 2.5504 2.6384 2.0410 3.8375 3.3816 2.7761
Wage Gap (%) −3.3531 1.6807 7.5176 15.6758 5.9849 15.7740
Post College
Union Workers(%) 1.7459 1.4257 2.1603 3.5806 2.6052 3.3199
Wage Gap (%) −16.5677 −13.7225 1.5243 −2.6219 3.2816 14.1314
Total Union Workers
in Lab Market (%) 15.1318 18.6660 22.9953 13.2431 13.8888 15.8986
80
Table 3.4: Change in Unconditional Wage Distribution from 1990-2010
Male
Index 2010 2000 1990 ∆ 2010-2000 ∆ 2000-1990
10th quant 2.0399 2.0264 2.0195 0.0135 0.0068
(2.0384, 2.0417) (2.0247, 2.0293) (2.0168, 2.0212) (0.0106, 0.0162) (0.0042, 0.0098)
25th quant 2.4850 2.4523 2.4744 0.0327 −0.0220
(2.4839, 2.4857) (2.4498, 2.4549) (2.4725, 2.4762) (0.0300, 0.0351) (−0.0256,−0.01829)
50th quant 2.9565 2.9320 2.9409 0.0244 −0.0088
(2.9551, 2.9669) (2.9301, 2.9337) (2.9399, 2.9429) (0.0229, 0.0263) (−0.0113,−0.0072)
75th quant 3.3839 3.3531 3.3662 0.0308 −0.0131
(3.3816, 3.3860) (3.3512, 3.3553) (3.3649, 3.3677) (0.0274, 0.0339) (−0.0158,−0.0107)
90th quant 3.8249 3.7372 3.7014 0.0877 0.0357
(3.8213, 3.8273) (3.7354, 3.7394) (3.6987, 3.7029) (0.0853, 0.0923) (0.0330, 0.0385)
Gini coeff 0.1387 0.13648 0.1300 0.0022 0.0063
(0.1382, 0.1411) (0.1353, 0.13865) (0.1290, 0.1311) (−0.0014, 0.0046) (0.0047, 0.0083)
Female
Index 2010 2000 1990 ∆ 2010-2000 ∆ 2000-1990
10th quant 1.8875 1.8475 1.7943 0.0400 0.0531
(1.8847, 1.8899) (1.8457, 1.8496) (1.7930, 1.7960) (0.0358, 0.0427) (0.0506, 0.0559)
25th quant 2.2643 2.2326 2.1762 0.0317 0.0563
(2.2635, 2.2656) (2.2304, 2.2344) (2.1741, 2.1787) (0.0293, 0.0338) (0.0537, 0.0595)
50th quant 2.6186 2.6431 2.5958 0.0538 0.0473
(2.6945, 2.6996) (2.6408, 2.6457) (2.5942, 2.5972) (0.0487, 0.0566) (0.0450, 0.0515)
75th quant 3.0412 3.0687 2.9973 0.0718 0.0713
(3.1382, 3.1424) (3.0670, 3.0711) (2.9954, 2.9996) (0.0687, 0.0744) (0.0689, 0.0743)
90th quant 3.4571 3.4483 3.3455 0.0921 0.1028
(3.5381, 3.5435) (3.4469, 3.3430) (3.3430, 3.3472) (0.0888, 0.0942) (0.0998, 0.1047)
Gini coeff 0.1410 0.1399 0.1347 0.0011 0.0051
(0.1389, 0.1433) (0.1377, 0.1424) (0.1293, 0.1374) (−0.0010, 0.0039) (0.0012, 0.0080)
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Table 3.5: Decomposition of Wage Distribution Function over the Period 1990-2010
Male
∆ 2010-2000 ∆ 2000-1990
Index Composition Wage Structure Residual Composition Wage Structure Residual
10th quant −0.0007 −0.0025 0.0168 0.0051 0.0188 −0.0171
(−0.0016, 0.0030) (−0.0048, 0.0000) (0.0138, 0.0208) (0.0044, 0.0060) (0.0158, 0.0228) (−0.0214,−0.0140)
25th quant 0.0023 0.0066 0.0237 −0.0020 −0.0057 −0.0142
(0.0016, 0.0030) (0.0046,−0.0086) (0.0207, 0.0261) (−0.0027,−0.0012) (−0.0078,−0.0037) (−0.0174,−0.0112)
50th quant 0.0044 0.0142 0.0057 −0.0023 −0.0068 0.0003
(0.0039, 0.0049) (0.0127, 0.0156) (0.0034, 0.0078) (−0.0030,−0.0019) (−0.0083,−0.0047) (−0.0021, 0.0021)
75th quant 0.0056 0.0171 0.0080 −0.0030 −0.0088 −0.0013
(0.0048, 0.0062) (0.0152, 0.0191) (0.0063, 0.0102) (−0.0035,−0.0025) (−0.0104,−0.0076) (−0.0033, 0.0007)
90th quant 0.0195 0.0618 0.0063 0.0093 0.0312 −0.0049
(0.0187, 0.0203) (0.0590, 0.0636) (0.0028, 0.0084) (0.0087, 0.0098) (0.0293, 0.0338) (−0.0081,−0.0024)
Gini coeff −0.0003 −0.0003 0.0039 0.0001 0.0001 0.0040
(−0.0005,−0.0000) −(0.0006,−0.0001) (0.0035, 0.0045) (−0.0000, 0.0003) (−0.000, 0.0004) (0.0033, 0.0044)
Female
∆ 2010-2000 ∆ 2000-1990
Index Composition Wage Structure Residual Composition Wage Structure Residual
10th quant 0.0068 0.0215 0.0116 0.0287 0.0440 −0.0197
(0.0062, 0.0075) (0.0177, 0.0232) (0.0087, 0.0145) (0.0267, 0.0312) (0.0427, 0.0451) (−0.0225,−0.0170)
25th quant 0.0115 0.0316 −0.0114 0.0243 0.0382 −0.0062
(0.0104, 0.0121) (0.0299, 0.0329) (−0.0138,−0.0087) (0.0231, 0.0253) (0.0375, 0.0392) (−0.0086,−0.0031)
50th quant 0.0160 0.0453 −0.0075 0.0195 0.0253 0.0024
(0.0154, 0.0168) (0.0437, 0.0472) (−0.0101,−0.0057) (0.0183, 0.0208) (0.0245, 0.0267) (0.0003, 0.0044)
75th quant 0.0197 0.0552 −0.0031 0.0032 0.0575 0.0106
(0.0190, 0.0204) (0.0531, 0.0567) (−0.0057,−0.0006) (0.0029, 0.0036) (0.05525, 0.0605) (0.0084, 0.0138)
90th quant 0.0254 0.0718 −0.0052 0.0185 0.6593 −0.5750
(0.0247, 0.0269) (0.0695, 0.0747) (−0.0084,−0.0024) (0.0175, 0.0192) (0.6576, 0.6605) (−0.5764,−0.5733)
Gini coeff 0.0003 0.0003 0.0023 −0.0002 −0.0000 0.0023
(0.0000, 0.0008) (0.0000, 0.0007) (0.0016, 0.0032) (−0.0011, 0.0012) (−0.0004, 0.0005) (−0.0003, 0.0035)
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Table 3.6: Box-Cox Unconditional Quantile Partial Effects of Unionization from 1990-2010
Index Year 10th quant 25th quant 50th quant 75th quant 90th quant
Male
Year 2010 0.2262 0.2470 0.2197 0.0088 −0.2037
(0.2175, 0.2377) (0.2392, 0.2557) (0.2118, 0.2266) (−0.0023, 02133) (−0.2196,−0.1936)
Year 2000 0.1873 0.2129 0.2203 0.0599 −0.0837
(0.1818, 0.1945) (0.2050, 0.2191) (0.2133, 0.2303) (0.0530, 0.0713) (−0.0946,−0.0750)
Year 1990 0.1876 0.2172 0.2295 0.1076 −0.0449
(0.1819, 0.2096) (0.2096, 0.2241) (0.2242, 0.2356) (0.1021, 0.1201) (−0.0515,−0.0347)
Female
Year 2010 0.1568 0.1592 0.1800 0.1071 −0.0437
(0.1489, 0.1648) (0.1517, 0.17054) (0.1720, 0.1877) (0.0909, 0.1192) (−0.0606,−0.0294)
Year 2000 0.1049 0.1104 0.1739 0.1146 0.0138
(0.0955, 0.1138) (1042, 0.1174) (0.1678, 0.1838) (0.1044, 0.1269) (−0.0066, 0.0262)
Year 1990 0.1797 0.2139 0.2423 0.2434 0.1380
(0.1710, 0.1859) (0.2076, 0.2197) (0.2376, 0.2483) (0.2347, 0.2549) (0.1257, 0.1476)
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Table 3.7: Linear Quantile Regression Marginal Effects of Unionization from 1990-2010
Index Year 10th quant 25th quant 50th quant 75th quant 90th quant
Male
Year 2010 0.2343 0.1746 0.1011 −0.0049 −0.0404
(0.2089, 0.2658) (0.1803, 0.2014) (0.0992, 0.1219) (−0.0140,−0.0009) (−0.0493,−0.0274)
Year 2000 0.1966 0.1139 0.1027 0.0690 −0.0246
(0.1810, 0.2047) (0.1065, 0.1213) (0.0936, 0.1127) (0.0621, 0.0755) (−0.0352,−0.0139)
Year 1990 0.1922 0.1276 0.1086 0.0841 0.0398
(0.1795, 0.2047) (0.1181, 0.1394) (0.1017, 0.1146) (0.0777, 0.0894) (0.0343, 0.0467)
Female
Year 2010 0.3228 0.1703 0.0637 0.0531 0.0177
(0.2856, 0.3560) (0.1545, 0.1846) (0.0540, 0.0744) (0.0442, 0.0692) (0.0023, 0.0394)
Year 2000 0.2540 0.1676 0.0801 0.0314 0.0012
(0.2371, 0.2656) (0.1570, 0.1775) (0.0672, 0.1059) (0.0211, 0.0401) (−0.0074, 0.0097)
Year 1990 0.3006 0.2687 0.1868 0.1028 0.0347
(0.2937, 0.3101) (0.2574, 0.2768) (0.1830, 0.1919) (0.0990, 0.1083) (0.0295, 0.0519)
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Table 3.8: Effects of Declining Unionization on Wage Inequality Over the Period 1990-2010
Year 1990-2010
50/10 Percentile Wage Gap 90/50 Percentile Wage Gap
Male
0.0178 0.0035
(0.0177, 0.0179) (0.0034, 0.0036)
Female
−0.0009 −0.0010
(−0.0010,−0.0008) (−0.0011,−0.0009)
? The numbers in the table show the hourly log wage gaps of different percentiles between
the counterfactual wages and the actual 2010 wages. Counterfactual wage is defined as if
the distribution of union workers is same in 1990 and workers’ all other characteristics
remain the same in 2010 and workers are paid according to the 2010 market prices. The
numbers in the parentheses represent the 95 percent bootstrap confidence interval for 100
replications.
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CHAPTER IV
Sorting in the Labor Market Based on Workers’
Noncognitive Skills
4.1 Introduction
A large number of studies focus on the role of cognitive and noncognitive skills on the
individual labor market outcomes. The main implication of the equalizing differences theory
is that in the labor market, workers sort out their occupations based on their preferences
over the different job characteristics. Workers who are in teaching and nursing occupations
need to be relatively caring in dealing with people and patients. Managers need to have
relatively more resource management skills. Similarly scientist need be good at analyzing
information. Krueger and Schkade (2008) find that workers who are more gregarious, based
on their behavior off the job, tend to choose the jobs that involve more social interaction.
This study presents evidences on whether workers sort out their occupations based on
their preference over the job characteristics and their noncognitive skills. This motivation of
this paper is to explain the recent trends of the gender and racial wage gaps since previous
studies showed that labor market sorting behavior plays a very important role to explain
the gender and racial wage gap. Numerous studies focus on the role of cognitive skills on
schooling and wages and noncognitive skills on individual labor market outcome such as
labor market success but there are not many studies attempt to explain the labor market
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sorting behavior based on workers’ cognitive and noncognitive skills. Krueger and Schkade
(2008) points out that the extent of workers’ sorting by preferences has implications for many
labor market policies and for economic theory.
The classical labor market wage equilibrium model ignores the fact that the equilibrium
wage is the sum of two distinct transactions, one for labor services and workers characteris-
tics, and another for job attributes. The theory of equalizing differences take into account
that workers pay a positive price for preferred job characteristics and the price paid by the
employers to induce workers to undertake some undesirable tasks takes the form of a wage
premium, a negative price for the job. Rosen (1986) shows that the observed distribution of
wages clears both markets, overall job characteristics and job attributes under the assump-
tion of perfect information on both sides of the market. This suggest that in the theory of
equalizing differences, labor market can be viewed as an implicit market of job characteristics
and worker’s attributes and the resulting market equilibrium associates a wage for each job
task.
Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua (2006) propose a theoretical occupational choice model
based on worker’s cognitive and noncognitive skills. Instead of using different occupational
choice as the outcome variable, Heckman et al. (2006) use the latent utility associated with
choosing a white collar occupation or blue collar occupation. This paper uses a different
approach compared to the Heckman et al. (2006) model and follows the basic framework
of equalizing differences to explain the labor market sorting mechanism. Rosen’s (1986)
model can explain why an individual worker accepts a less attractive job in terms of wage by
incorporating the monetary compensation of undesirable job characteristics. However, this
model cannot explain what induces workers’ preferences over job characteristics. This paper
proposes an extension of Rosen’s (1986) basic model of equalizing differences by explaining
the role of noncognitive skills on worker’s job preferences to explain the labor market sorting
behavior.
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This paper proposes a one period static model where job characteristics are given to
any individual worker. The representative worker’s preference over those job characteristics
depends on his/her given level of cognitive and noncognitive skills. For example, a high skilled
introvert worker who enjoys working independently on challenging cognitive problem may
not choose an occupation which requires frequent interaction with co-workers or customers.
Similarly, a low skilled extrovert workers prefers an occupation which requires relatively more
social interaction.
Individuals vary in their stock of cognitive and noncognitive skills and jobs differ in terms
of the task levels in the proposed model. High skilled workers have higher job satisfaction in
the occupations which require higher level of cognitive skills to perform a given task in the
proposed model. The model assumes that an individual worker has perfect information on
his/her stock of cognitive and noncognitive skills, task level and other job characteristics of
any job, and the wage differential between given any two jobs. Potential employers also have
full information to perfectly determine which worker can perform the task level assigned in a
given job. As a result, apart from this worker’s job preferences, the equilibrium employment
also depends on the observed wage differentials to equalize the total monetary compensation
of job activities that are differentiate by various attributes- working environments, worker
skills and other job requirements.
Labor market sorting behavior plays an important role why in the U.S. labor market
male-female wage gap is shrinking over time, especially at the upper tail of the income
distribution, while the black-white wage gap remains steady during the 2000s. Filer (1983)
argues that personality plays an important role in explaining labor market outcomes and
gender wage differentials. Borghans, Weel and Weinberg (2006) investigate whether changes
in the importance of the noncognitive skills can explain why women’s wage increased more
rapidly, while the wages of black grew more slowly over these years relative to earlier years
in the U.S. labor market during the period of the late 1970s to the early 1990s.
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Bertrand and Hallock (2001), Goldin (2004) find that the growth of a wide variety of
white collar jobs combined with the greater ability of women to hold certain professional
jobs help to reduce the gender wage gap. Weinberg (2000) shows that computerization of
the labor market has taken away some of the physical disadvantages women had in a non-
computerized labor market. By using two single-cohort longitudinal surveys data, Fortin
(2006) investigates the impact of greed, ambition, leadership, altruism, gender role attitudes,
family values and income expectations on the gender gap and finds that some of these
soft skills have significant impact while others do not. Bayard et al. (2003) show that in
the U.S. labor market, a major portion of the male-female wage gap can be explained by
the segregation of women into the lower-paying occupations, industries, establishments and
occupations within establishments during the 1990s.
By using the Current Population Survey (CPS) data, this paper shows that the relative
employment share of women is higher in the occupations in which people tasks are more
important. The reverse is true for black workers. Becker (1971), Holzer and Ihlanfeldt (1998)
propose the hypothesis that racial, ethnic, linguistic, and cultural differences interfere with
the performance of people tasks because of two possible reasons. First, the members of such
minority groups are less able to interact with members of the majority groups and second,
the co-workers or the customers are prejudiced toward minority groups.
This paper focuses on how workers sort out their occupations based on their noncognitive
skills by using the O*NET and CPS data. O*NET data classifies noncognitive skills in
different sub categories and allow us to investigate which types of noncognitive skills have
significant impact on different types of occupation. Additionally, this paper also shows the
labor market sorting results by gender and race. These labor marketing sorting mechanism
by subgroups helps us to understand how occupational choice plays an important role to
explain male-female and black-white wage gaps in the U.S. labor market.
This paper proposes a simple extension of Rosen’s (1986) basic framework of equalizing
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differences model. Estimated marginal effects of different types of noncognitive skills to
choose occupations such as clerical and sales, and service with respect to the occupation
professional, managerial and technical are almost always greater than 1 in a multinominal
logit model. The results also vary over gender and race. It is shown that female workers prefer
to choose the occupations which require more social interactions. These results complement
those in recent work by Krueger and Schkade (2008), who find that workers who have higher
social skills tend to choose the jobs which involve frequent social interaction.
The paper is constructed as follows. Section 2 represents the sorting mechanism model.
In section 3, I describes the data from two different data sources and the construction of
the noncognitive measure. Section 4 provides the main results of this paper. I conclude in
section 5.
4.2 Economic Model
We start with a equilibrium wage setting model where wage not only depends on workers
human capital but also depends on the workers’ occupation given the other demographic
characteristics. In this set up, the wage equation is given by:
w = w(z, θ|X = x) (4.1)
where z is the human capital stock, θ denotes the occupation and X is the set of other
demographic variables related to wage.
In this model, occupation has been defined by task level, and to perform that task level,
workers need to have certain skills. Acemoglu and Autor (2011) define task as a unit of work
activity that produces output (goods and services), whereas skill is a worker’s endowment of
capabilities for performing various tasks. The distinction between skill and tasks becomes
particularly relevant when workers of a given skill level can perform a variety of tasks. In a
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dynamic wage setting model, the set of task workers perform depends on the labor market
conditions, such as technology.
Each job has different tasks and occupation is a collection of different jobs. To simplify
the model, I assume every occupation has only one job. The model can be easily generalised
for multiple jobs in a single occupation. Each occupation then has some job characteristics
based on the tasks. Job characteristics are fixed for any given period in a static model.
However, in a multi-period dynamic model, job characteristics depend on the task level
through the technological changes. It is assumed that job characteristics are given to any
worker and workers make their optimal choices based on that given conditions.
We borrow from Cunha and Heckman’s (2007, 2008) model of human capital formation
based on cognitive and noncognitive skills given the early childhood investment by parents
(Ip):
z = z(zc, znc|Ip) (4.2)
Cunha and Heckman (2008) considered a general model where cognitive skills can promote
the formation of the noncognitive skills and vice-versa. In this model we do not observe the
parental investment Ip, as a result the level of cognitive skills (zc) and noncognitive skills
(znc) for any worker is fixed when a worker enters into the labor market. The stock of zc
and znc also develops during on the job training.
4.2.1 Job Preference Function
In this model, each worker has preference over the job characteristics. In the labor
market sorting literature we implicitly assume that this individuals job preference function
are independent of their cognitive and noncognitive skills. The proposed model relaxes this
assumption. The individual job preference function has the following implicit functional
form:
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τi = τ(z
i
c, z
i
nc|ηj) (4.3)
where τi is the ith person’s job preference function and ηj is the set of job characteristics of
the jth occupation. We define ηj as:
ηj = ηj(ηj1, ηj2, ...., ηjk) (4.4)
where these job characteristics are functions of task level. In a multi-period dynamic model,
job characteristics also depend on the supply of workers for that occupation. It is assumed
that ηj is fixed and given as a constraint to an individual worker.
4.2.2 Sorting Mechanism
There are mainly two factors, individual job preference function and task level play an
important role in the labor market sorting mechanism. The interaction between these two
factors can explain individual worker’s sorting behavior on equilibrium occupational choice.
Job preference function represents the supply side behavior of the labor market and task level
of any job represents firm’s demand side phenomenon. The equilibrium wage depends on the
workers cognitive and noncognitive skill levels and the task level of any given occupation.
Suppose a representative worker i has two occupations to choose from. Denote the
occupations as η1 and η2. I choose a two occupation model because of the simplicity. This
model can be generalized for n occupational choice model. Define t1 and t2 are the task
levels for occupation η1 and η2 respectively where t2 > t1. It is reasonable to assume that
wages are directly proportional to the task levels. Thus wage in the second occupation (η2)
is higher compared to the first occupation (η1) because the task level is higher in the second
occupation.
To perform the task level t1 and t2, workers need the skill level zmin and z
? respectively.
We assume that workers have a continuous skill distribution from zmin to zmax where z
? <
92
zmax. Each worker from this skill distribution has a preference function over these two
occupations. This preference function is a rank function through which individual worker
ranks the occupation based on his/her skill level and job characteristics. We denote τ1 when
workers prefer first occupation and τ2 for the second occupation. We have the following two
possible cases to consider based on the ranges of values of z, in a two occupational model:
(i) for z < z?: {τ1, τ2} (ii) for z ≥ z? : {τ1, τ2}.
A trivial case is when an individual worker’s skill level is less than z?. Although the
worker has two occupation to choose from, he/she has to choose the first occupation η1
because the worker can not perform the task level of the second occupation η2. In this case
the worker’s preference function has no role to play because the worker has no other option
except to choose the first occupation. From an employer point of view, a firm would never
hire someone who is not able to perform the given task required for the second occupation.
This is possible only when employers have perfect signal on workers’ skill levels.
Another possible outcome is when an individual worker’s skill level is greater equal to
than z?. In this case, a worker can choose either occupation because he/she is capable of
performing both the task. Assume that a worker prefers the second occupation over the first
one. This implies that either the worker likes the job characteristics of the second job or the
wage compensation between the two occupations dominates the monetary value of disliking
some of the job characteristics. We can only observe the outcome, as a result we don’t know
which of the above two cases is true for any individual worker.
Suppose an individual worker prefers the second job compared to the first one even if the
second job pays a higher wage. I follow the basic framework of equalizing differences model
developed by Rosen (1986) and I make necessary changes for this given set up to analyse
this case. Define M as the compensating variation necessary for a worker to be indifferent
between accepting the job η1 or η2. That is, implicitly define M by the following equation,
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u(w1|τ1, z1) = u(w2 +M |τ2, z2) (4.5)
where M compensates a worker’s preference over the first job and makes the worker indif-
ferent between two jobs. M measures the monetary compensation of second job η2, since we
implicitly assume that representative worker does not like the job characteristics of η2. M
can also be think off as the reservation price of job characteristics employers need to pay to
make the worker indifferent between accepting two jobs η1 and η2.
Denote ∆W is the wage differential between the two occupations and ∆W is always
positive since w2 is higher than w1. Note that ∆W is fixed for all workers but M depends
on the personal taste which varies from person to person, depending on their own circum-
stances and inherent preferences. For example, if someone strongly dislikes some of the job
characteristics of the second job η2, his/her M is higher compared to the person who dis-
likes the job characteristics of the second job less. However, some workers may like the job
characteristics of η2 compared to η1 or be indifferent, in that case M takes the value zero.
I denote the probability density function of M across the members of labor force as f(M)
and the cumulative distribution function of M as F (M) and normalize the total labor force
to 1. Again, denote the density function of worker’s skill level z as g(z) and the cumulative
distribution function as G(z). Then the supply of workers in the first occupation (η1) is
given by:
N1 =
z?∫
0
g(z)dz +
1∫
z?
1∫
∆W
f(M)g(z)dMdz (4.6)
The first part of the above equation,
z?∫
0
g(z)dz, represents those workers who do not have
the skills to perform the task in the second occupation, causing them to choose the first
occupation. The second part shows that among those workers who are capable of performing
the task in both the jobs η1 and η2, they choose the first job η1 because their reservation
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compensating monetary variation M is higher than the wage differential between the first
and second occupation. The supply of workers in second occupation (η2) is given by:
N2 =
1∫
z?
1− 1∫
∆W
f(M)
 g(z)dMdz
=
1∫
z?
∆W∫
0
f(M)g(z)dMdz (4.7)
The above equation represents the remaining fraction of workers in the second occupation.
These workers’ reservation compensating monetary variation Ms are lower than the wage
differential ∆W . The difference between this set up with Rosen’s (1986) equalizing differences
model is that the proposed model adds workers’ skill distribution to the workers’ optimal
choice decision. In the long run equilibrium, the number of workers in η2 depends on the
distribution of the cost of modifying job characteristics by firms. Assume that f(M) and
g(z) are normal, then we have the following selection bias terms as the discrepancy between
the conditional and unconditional expectation functions:
E(z|τ1) = µz − σz
(
φ
(
z? − µz
σz
)
/Φ
(
z? − µz
σz
))
(4.8)
E(M |τ1) = µM − σM
(
φ
(
∆W − µM
σM
)
/Φ
(
∆W − µM
σM
))
(4.9)
4.2.3 Implementation of the Sorting Model
To implement the model, workers’ years of schooling is used as a proxy of the skill level
such that when education level is greater than a threshold value z?, an individual worker
has the option to choose either occupation. The implicit assumption is that workers skill
levels and schooling are highly correlated. The choice of z? is the most important empirical
challenge to implement the proposed sorting model because there are one to one mappings
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between schooling and skills required for different tasks. This implies that some less educated
workers may be in the skilled sector occupation and vice versa. However, as long as the
percentage of these two groups of workers are significantly low, schooling can be used as a
proxy of the skill level z?.
The simplest choice of z? is the average education level of occupation τ1. A better
measure of proxy variable is the specific degree requirement for any given task. One of
the advantages of using the average education level as a proxy of z? is that we can use
different values of schooling to check the labor market sorting behavior. Suppose z?1 and z
?
2
are the average education levels for the first and second occupation respectively. One can
use different values of z? ∈ (z?1 , z?2) for the purpose of robustness check. If the qualitative
results of sorting behavior hold for different values of z?, then there must exist strong labor
market sorting behavior based on noncognitive skills.
M is not observable for any individual. To estimate M , we need to construct a counter-
factual wage for each worker. Suppose an individual worker chooses occupation τ1. Then the
counterfactual wage is defined as what would have been the wage of that worker if he/she
chooses occupation τ2. The counterfactual wage of an individual worker in occupation τ1 is
the wage of another worker who has similar observable characteristics in the occupation τ2.
The observable characteristics are schooling, experience, race and gender.
To estimate the counterfactual wage, suppose we consider four different education levels
such as high school graduate, some college, college graduate and masters and above, and forty
years of experience giving us 640 different groups of workers1. The average of each group of
workers in τ2 is the counterfactual wage of the same group of workers in τ1. One can also use
more robust method to construct the counterfactual wage as shown by DiNardo, Fortin and
Lemieux (1996), Machodo and Mata (2005) and Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2011), Ghosh
(2014).
1The combination of four different education levels and forty years of experience implies 160 groups of
workers. We can further separate out the groups in terms of their race and gender. As a result we have total
160× 2× 2 = 640 different groups of workers.
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Suppose p1 and p2 to be the probability of choosing the first and second occupation, then
one can use the following multinominal logit model specification:
log
(
p1
p2
)
= α0 + x1β1 + x2β2 + λz(z) + λM(M) + ε
where x1 and x2 are the set of noncognitive skills and control variables, respectively, and
λz(.) and λM(.) are the inverse Mills ratios of z and M . The advantage of using multinominal
logit model in this case is that if we have more than two occupations, the log odds ratio,(
p1
p2
)
, does not depend on the choices of the other occupations, which follows from the
independence of the disturbances (ε).
To summarize, previous studies by Rosen (1986), Kruger and Schkade (2008) and many
others have ignored the Heckman sample selection bias corrected term λz(.) to explain the
labor market sorting behavior. As shown, ignoring the workers skill distribution on occupa-
tional choice model leads to bias and inconsistent coefficients because of the sample selection
specification error. This paper proposes a solution of the problem by using number of years
of schooling as the proxy of the workers skill level. However, the empirical challenge to
implement the model is to determine the threshold value of schooling which makes a rep-
resentative worker not attempts to work in the more skilled sector occupation. This paper
also proposes average education level of relatively low skilled occupation as a proxy of z?
and for robustness check, one can use different values of education level as z?.
4.3 Data
Two data sources are used in this paper, O*NET (Occupational Information Network)
and CPS (Current Population Survey). CPS contains income and all the necessary demo-
graphic variables of individual workers and O*NET contains workers’ cognitive and non-
cognitive skills scales for 400 occupations, which exceeds the number of unique census occu-
pation codes.
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The 5 percent self-weighted 2010 sample CPS data consist of U.S.-born black and white
men and women aged 18-65 with positive annual earnings and hours worked in the year
preceding the census, and a nonzero sampling weight. The wage measure used is an hourly
wage measure computed by dividing earnings by hours of work for workers not paid by
the hour. For workers paid by the hour, I use a direct measure of the hourly wage rate.
CPS weights are used throughout the empirical analysis. The regressors consist of years of
schooling, potential experience and experience square, union coverage, marital status, race,
gender, and statistical metropolitan area.
Like many researchers including Goos and Manning (2007), Goos, Manning and Salmons
(2010), Autor and Acemoglu (2011), Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2011) who study the task
content of jobs, I use the O*NET data to measure workers’s cognitive and noncognitive skills.
To keep categories manageable and self explanatory, out of 400 occupations in O*NET, we
use broad occupational groupings in a total of seven. The seven classes are defined in
CPS as: (1) professional and managerial and technical (2) clerical and sales (3) service (5)
production (6) operators (7) transport. These seven categories map logically into the broad
clusters identified in the conceptual framework.
Broadly speaking, managerial, professional and technical occupations are specialized in
abstract, non-routine cognitive tasks. Clerical and sales occupations are specialized in routine
cognitive tasks, production and operative occupations are specialized in routine manual tasks.
O*NET task measures also make further distinction between non-routine cognitive analytical
tasks and non-routine cognitive interpersonal and managerial tasks, routine cognitive and
routine manual tasks. Logically, routine cognitive tasks are most prevalent in production
and operative positions. Finally, non-routine manual tasks are those requiring flexibility
and physical adaptability are most intensively used in production, operative and service
positions.
To construct the variables, cognitive and noncognitive skills, I follow the three different
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measures of both cognitive and noncognitive skills from the O*NET data. Cognitive skills
are composed of three broad category : (1) Decision making ability, (2) Data analyzing
ability and (3) Resource management skills. Similarly noncognitive skills composed of (1)
Interaction with others, (2) Interpersonal relationship and (3) Social skills. All these different
types of cognitive and noncognitive skills are divided into many sub categories. Those sub
categorical divisions are shown in the data appendix section.
The CPS and O*NET data sets are merged by using the three digit occupation code.
For each occupation, the O*NET provides information on the ‘importance’ and ‘level’ of
the required skill. Blinder (2007) arbitrarily assigns a Cobb-Douglas weight of two thirds
to ‘importance’ and one third to ‘level’ to construct the required skill level for the task of
any given occupation. In this study, I have used only the information under ‘importance’
because in the subcategories of the above mentioned six types of cognitive and noncognitive
skills, almost two third cases the information on ‘level’ is missing. To obtain the six different
measures of cognitive and noncognitive skills, I take the average of all those subcategories.
4.4 Labor Market Sorting Results
Table 1 represents the summary statistics of the O*NET and Current Population Survey
(CPS) data. Both cognitive and noncognitive skills have been divided into three subcate-
gories. The first column shows the mean of the six types of cognitive and noncognitive skills
across all the occupations. Note that the highest average skill required for all occupations is
social skill and the lowest skill is the resource management skill. The two most important
skills are social skills and data analyzing ability across all the occupations. Two types of
noncognitive skills, interaction with others and interpersonal relationships are equally im-
portant as cognitive skills, such as decision making ability. This table shows that irrespective
of the types of occupations, noncognitive skills are equally important as cognitive skills to
perform any given task.
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The bottom half of table 1 shows the summary statistics of the demographic character-
istics and the human capital variables. The sample consists of around half female workers,
12 percent black, 62 percent married and 76 percent urban workers. These numbers are
fairly representative of the U.S. labor force. The average schooling is around 13 years with
a standard deviation of 2.76 years. The last row represents the potential experience of the
U.S. labor force. Potential experience may not reflect the actual experience since the CPS
data does not track when a workers goes in and out of the labor force for a short period of
time.
For male workers, potential experience has been calculated by subtracting 6 and the years
of schooling from the worker’s age, which is why the maximum potential experience is 59
years. It is a reasonable assumption that the male workers do not go out of the labor force
too often. However this assumption is not valid for female workers because female workers
may go out of the labor market multiple times for child birth. Buchnisky (1998) shows that
ignoring that fact leads to potential measurement errors so I use his proposed method to
estimate the female work experience by taking into account how many children any female
worker have. If the number of children is zero then Buchnisky’s (1998) method boils down
to the method used for male workers’ potential experience.
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the O*NET and CPS data by seven different
occupations. These occupations are defined as in the CPS. Each column represents the
average cognitive and noncognitive skills of the workers of that specific occupation. The
numbers in the parenthesis are the standard deviations. The lower panel shows that the
mean and standard deviation of the demographic characteristics, human capital variables,
and log hourly wage of the workers by occupation.
Apart from the professional, managerial and technical occupation, workers who are in the
clerical and sales occupations need more cognitive skills compared to the occupations service,
production, operators and Transport services. We note that clerical and sales workers also
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have a higher level of average education compared to the workers in the occupations service,
production, operators and Transport services. Production workers need similar level of
cognitive skills and lower level of noncognitive skills. However, production workers’ average
wage is higher compared to the clerical and sales workers’. As shown, 63.12 percent female
workers are in the clerical and sales occupations, whereas 90.33 percent male workers are in
the production occupation. These suggest that female workers prefers to work in the clerical
and sales occupation compared to the production sector knowing that on an average yearly
production workers earn around $4, 500 more.
By comparing the service sector with the operators and transport services, we see that
the service sector needs more noncognitive skills compared to the operators and transport
services. These workers also have higher average levels of education. However, the average
of the hourly wage gap between the operator and transport sector with the service sector is
around 2.5 and 3.25 dollars per hour. The percentage of the female workers in the service
sector is around 60.71 percent whereas in the operators and transport services are 30.49
percent and 11.39 percent respectively. Again, on an average female workers prefer to work
in the service sector more than operators and transport services, knowing still that they can
earn more in operators and transport services.
From the above two comparisons, between clerical and production and service and op-
erators and transport services, it is clear that female workers prefer the occupation where
noncognitive skills are more important compared to the cognitive skills such as clerical and
sales, and service sector. However, this may not necessarily be true for male workers who
prefer to work in the cognitive skill intensive occupations because the production workers
have less schooling compared to the clerical and sales workers. The is also true for the
comparison between service and, operators and transport service workers. We don’t know
on average whether the male workers who are in the production, operators and transport
service can perform the task level required for clerical and sales, and service sector or male
workers in general prefer less noncognitive intensive skilled occupations.
101
As shown that the pattern of gender based labor market sorting does not hold for different
races. In the sample, the percentage of black workers is around 12 percent. However, we
note that only in two occupations professional, managerial and technical, and production the
percentage of black workers are lower than the average. For the rest of the four occupations
clerical and sales, service, operators and transport, the percentage is much higher than the
average. Note that professional, managerial and technical, and production are the top two
occupations in terms of the average hourly wage rate. The occupational choice of the black
workers plays an important role on why the racial wage gap is not falling over time unlike
the gender wage gap.
Table 3 reports the estimates log odd ratios of the multinominal logit models for the five
occupations, clerical and sales, service, production, operators and transport, with respect to
the baseline reference occupation professional, managerial and technical. The upper panel
shows the results when we ignore any threshold level of education for the skilled sector
occupation. This is the approach followed by the previous studies in the literature. As
shown, these results are biased and inconsistent because of the sample selection error. The
other half of table 3 shows the log odd ratios for high school graduate and college graduate
as the threshold for professional, managerial and technical occupation.
The independent variables are three types of measures of noncognitive skills in all the
labor marketing sorting models as shown in Table 3 to Table 6. These independent variables
are standardized to mean 0 and standard deviation 1 across all the occupations. We also
include controls for years of schooling, potential experience and experience square, marital
status, race, and statistical metropolitan area in all the estimated models. The rationale for
including these control variables is that they may be related with the worker’s productivity
and sorting based on worker’s noncognitive skills, which is predicted to take place among
workers who are equally productive.
The coefficient of interaction with others on clerical and sales occupation is 0.2462 as
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shown in Table 3 implies that for one standard deviation increase of the noncognitive skill
interaction with others, the odd ratio to choose the clerical and sales occupation with respect
to the professional, managerial and technical occupation increases by 0.2462%. This implies
that as long as the odd ratio is less than 1, for one standard deviation increase in any
particular type of noncognitive skills, workers are likely to choose the professional, managerial
and technical occupation as opposed to the other occupations.
The marginal effect of the odds ratio for interpersonal relationship skill is greater than
1 for the occupations clerical and sales, service, operators and transport services except the
occupation operators. Again, the marginal effects of social skills on clerical and sales and
all three types of noncognitive skills on the service sector occupation are greater than 1 and
varies from 1.19 to 4.5 for the specification where high school graduation as threshold for
skilled sector occupation and from 1.18 to 4.39 for no threshold education level.
These results suggest that for one standard deviation increase in different types of noncog-
nitive skills such as interpersonal relationship and social skill, workers prefer to choose clerical
and sales and service sector occupation compared to the professional, managerial and tech-
nical occupation. These results hold for both the specification either z? = 12 or 0. This
phenomenon is known as labor market sorting because workers choose their occupation based
on their preferences over job characteristics and their noncognitive skill levels.
Table 4 and table 5 show the marginal effects of the three different types of noncognitive
skills on the log odd ratios for the five occupations by gender and race, respectively. The
sorting behaviors based on the noncognitive skills for the subgroups, male, female, white and
black, are very similar to the overall pattern as shown in Table 3 for both the specifications.
The marginal effects of noncognitive skills on the clerical and sales, and service sectors
occupations are in general greater than one by gender and race.
The difference between the coefficients of similar subgroup of workers for the different
specifications are both positive and negative as shown in Table 4 and Table 5. Some of
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those differences are statistically significant. This suggests that ignoring any threshold level
of education cause biases in both the directions. By summarizing the results from Table
3 to Table 5, we conclude that for marginal changes in noncognitive skills, workers prefer
the clerical and sales, and service occupations compared to the professional, managerial and
technical occupation.
4.5 Conclusion
This paper shows a positive and statistically significant relationship between noncognitive
skills and workers’ sorting behavior in the U.S. labor market. In this study the level of
workers’ cognitive and noncognitive skills are exogenous by implicitly assuming that the
stock of different noncognitive skills marginally changes, compared to the initial level because
of on the job training. Although we control for total years of experience, ideally we need
to control for the experience of how long the worker is employed in the current job. The
incremental changes in skills due to on the job training bias the estimates in the upward
direction.
To avoid the upward bias problem, we report the odd ratios of the probabilities to choose
different occupations with respect to the professional, managerial and technical occupation
rather than showing the actual parameter estimate for each occupation. As long as the
biases are in the same direction given that an individual gains positive skills through on the
job training in both the occupations, the marginal effects of the noncognitive skills on the
probability odd ratio does not affect much. It is highly unlikely that in one occupation, a
worker’s noncognitive skill decreases during the job training, that possibility has been ruled
out.
Although the stock of noncognitive skills is the outcome variable in many labor market
studies, the objective of this study is not to explain what causes workers’ different levels
of noncognitive skills. A growing literature establishes that parental investment and early
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childhood environment have substantial impact on later life outcomes (see Knudsen et al.
2006, Cunha and Heckman 2008, Almond and Currie 2011). Recently, Heckman et al. (2013)
show the mechanism through which early childhood experience affect adults’ labor market
outcomes.
Another concern is that workers treat the job characteristics as exogenously given to
them. In a long run dynamic wage setting model, the job characteristics also depend on
the workers preference function and the supply of workers in that job. Employers need to
change the working environment and other aspects of jobs depending on the flow of workers
and the monetary compensation. Employers can only change the monetary compensation
rather than changing the job characteristics because it depends on the task level in the short
run. A useful direction of future work is to examine the role of cognitive and noncognitive
skills in the dynamic long run wage setting model.
There are two main contributions of this study in the literature. First, this paper proposes
a new labor market sorting model by incorporating workers’ cognitive and noncognitive skills
on their job preference function. We have the famous sample selection specification error
without considering the impact of workers’ skill levels on their occupational choice decision.
This paper proposes a solution to this problem by using education level as a proxy of workers’
cognitive skills.
Second, the marginal effects of different types of noncognitive skills to choose occupations
such as clerical and sales, and service with respect to the occupation professional, managerial
and technical are almost always greater than 1. The relative magnitude of the coefficients
varies a lot by race and gender. These results suggest that workers who have a higher level of
social and interpersonal skills prefer the clerical and sales, and service occupations compared
to the professional, managerial and sales given the existing wage differential occupation.
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Appendix:
The sub categories of cognitive and noncognitive skills are defined in the Occupational
Information Network website:
Decision Making Skill:
1. Category Flexibility: The ability to generate or use different sets of rules for
combining or grouping things in different ways.
2. Deductive Reasoning: The ability to apply general rules to specific problems to
produce answers that make sense.
3. Flexibility of Closure: The ability to identify or detect a known pattern (a figure,
object, word, or sound) that is hidden in other distracting material.
4. Fluency of Ideas: The ability to come up with a number of ideas about a topic (the
number of ideas is important, not their quality, correctness, or creativity).
5. Inductive Reasoning: The ability to combine pieces of information to form general
rules or conclusions (includes finding a relationship among seemingly unrelated events).
6. Information Ordering: The ability to arrange things or actions in a certain order
or pattern according to a specific rule or set of rules (e.g., patterns of numbers, letters,
words, pictures, mathematical operations).
7. Mathematical Reasoning: The ability to choose the right mathematical methods
or formulas to solve a problem.
8. Memorization: The ability to remember information such as words, numbers, pic-
tures, and procedures.
9. Number Facility: The ability to add, subtract, multiply, or divide quickly and
correctly.
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10. Oral Comprehension: The ability to listen to and understand information and
ideas presented through spoken words and sentences.
11. Originality: The ability to come up with unusual or clever ideas about a given topic
or situation, or to develop creative ways to solve a problem.
12. Perceptual Speed: The ability to quickly and accurately compare similarities and
differences among sets of letters, numbers, objects, pictures, or patterns. The things
to be compared may be presented at the same time or one after the other. This ability
also includes comparing a presented object with a remembered object.
13. Problem Sensitivity: The ability to tell when something is wrong or is likely to go
wrong. It does not involve solving the problem, only recognizing there is a problem.
14. Selective Attention: The ability to concentrate on a task over a period of time
without being distracted.
15. Spatial Orientation: The ability to know your location in relation to the environ-
ment or to know where other objects are in relation to you.
16. Speed of Closure: The ability to quickly make sense of, combine, and organize
information into meaningful patterns.
17. Time Sharing: The ability to shift back and forth between two or more activities
or sources of information (such as speech, sounds, touch, or other sources).
18. Visualization: The ability to imagine how something will look after it is moved
around or when its parts are moved or rearranged.
19. Written Comprehension: The ability to read and understand information and
ideas presented in writing.
20. Written Expression: The ability to communicate information and ideas in writing
so others will understand.
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Data Analyzing Skills:
1. Analyzing Data or Information: Identifying the underlying principles, reasons, or
facts of information by breaking down information or data into separate parts.
2. Developing Objectives and Strategies: Establishing long-range objectives and
specifying the strategies and actions to achieve them.
3. Evaluating Information to Determine Compliance with Standards: Using
relevant information and individual judgment to determine whether events or processes
comply with laws, regulations, or standards.
4. Judging the Qualities of Things, Services, or People: Assessing the value,
importance, or quality of things or people.
5. Making Decisions and Solving Problems: Analyzing information and evaluating
results to choose the best solution and solve problems.
6. Organizing, Planning, and Prioritizing Work: Developing specific goals and
plans to prioritize, organize, and accomplish your work.
7. Processing Information: Compiling, coding, categorizing, calculating, tabulating,
auditing, or verifying information or data.
8. Scheduling Work and Activities: Scheduling events, programs, and activities, as
well as the work of others.
9. Thinking Creatively: Developing, designing, or creating new applications, ideas,
relationships, systems, or products, including artistic contributions.
10. Updating and Using Relevant Knowledge: Keeping up-to-date technically and
applying new knowledge to your job.
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Resource Management Skill:
1. Management of Financial Resources: Determining how money will be spent to
get the work done, and accounting for these expenditures.
2. Management of Material Resources: Obtaining and seeing to the appropriate
use of equipment, facilities, and materials needed to do certain work.
3. Management of Personnel Resources: Motivating, developing, and directing
people as they work, identifying the best people for the job.
4. Time Management: Managing one’s own time and the time of others.
Interacting with Others:
1. Assisting and Caring for Others: Providing personal assistance, medical attention,
emotional support, or other personal care to others such as coworkers, customers, or
patients.
2. Coaching and Developing Others: Identifying the developmental needs of others
and coaching, mentoring, or otherwise helping others to improve their knowledge or
skills.
3. Communicating with Persons Outside Organization: Communicating with
people outside the organization, representing the organization to customers, the public,
government, and other external sources. This information can be exchanged in person,
in writing, or by telephone or e-mail.
4. Communicating with Supervisors, Peers, or Subordinates: Providing infor-
mation to supervisors, co-workers, and subordinates by telephone, in written form,
e-mail, or in person.
5. Coordinating the Work and Activities of Others: Getting members of a group
to work together to accomplish tasks.
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6. Developing and Building Teams: Encouraging and building mutual trust, respect,
and cooperation among team members.
7. Establishing and Maintaining Interpersonal Relationships: Developing con-
structive and cooperative working relationships with others, and maintaining them
over time.
8. Guiding, Directing, and Motivating Subordinates: Providing guidance and
direction to subordinates, including setting performance standards and monitoring
performance.
9. Interpreting the Meaning of Information for Others: Translating or explaining
what information means and how it can be used.
10. Monitoring and Controlling Resources: Monitoring and controlling resources
and overseeing the spending of money.
11. Performing Administrative Activities: Performing day-to-day administrative
tasks such as maintaining information files and processing paperwork.
12. Performing for or Working Directly with the Public: Performing for people
or dealing directly with the public. This includes serving customers in restaurants and
stores, and receiving clients or guests.
13. Provide Consultation and Advice to Others: Providing guidance and expert
advice to management or other groups on technical, systems-, or process-related topics.
14. Resolving Conflicts and Negotiating with Others: Handling complaints, settling
disputes, and resolving grievances and conflicts, or otherwise negotiating with others.
15. Selling or Influencing Others: Convincing others to buy merchandise/goods or to
otherwise change their minds or actions.
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16. Staffing Organizational Units: Recruiting, interviewing, selecting, hiring, and
promoting employees in an organization.
17. Training and Teaching Others: Identifying the educational needs of others, devel-
oping formal educational or training programs or classes, and teaching or instructing
others.
Interpersonal Relationship:
1. Contact With Others: How much does this job require the worker to be in contact
with others (face-to-face, by telephone, or otherwise) in order to perform it?
2. Coordinate or Lead Others: How important is it to coordinate or lead others in
accomplishing work activities in this job?
3. Deal With External Customers: How important is it to work with external
customers or the public in this job?
4. Deal With Physically Aggressive People: How frequently does this job require
the worker to deal with physical aggression of violent individuals?
5. Deal With Unpleasant or Angry People: How frequently does the worker have
to deal with unpleasant, angry, or discourteous individuals as part of the job require-
ments?
6. Electronic Mail: How often do you use electronic mail in this job?
7. Face-to-Face Discussions: How often do you have to have face-to-face discussions
with individuals or teams in this job?
8. Frequency of Conflict Situations: How often are there conflict situations the
employee has to face in this job?
9. Letters and Memos: How often does the job require written letters and memos?
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10. Public Speaking: How often do you have to perform public speaking in this job?
11. Responsibility for Outcomes and Results: How responsible is the worker for
work outcomes and results of other workers?
12. Responsible for Others’ Health and Safety: How much responsibility is there
for the health and safety of others in this job?
13. Telephone: How often do you have telephone conversations in this job?
14. Work With Work Group or Team: How important is it to work with others in a
group or team in this job?
Social Skill:
1. Coordination: Adjusting actions in relation to others’ actions.
2. Instructing: Teaching others how to do something.
3. Negotiation: Bringing others together and trying to reconcile differences.
4. Persuasion: Persuading others to change their minds or behavior.
5. Service Orientation: Actively looking for ways to help people.
6. Social Perceptiveness: Being aware of others’ reactions and understanding why
they react as they do.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of ONET and CPS Data for All
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Cognitive Skills
Decision Making Ability 0.4821 0.0744 0.2638 0.7033
Data Analyzing Ability 0.5740 0.1121 0.2480 0.8250
Resource Management 0.3342 0.1028 0.1250 0.6475
Non-cognitive Skills
Interaction With Others 0.4430 0.1062 0.1976 0.7841
Interpersonal Relationship 0.4662 0.0924 0.2064 0.7041
Social Skills 0.5890 0.1338 0.3050 0.9101
Demographics Characteristics
Female 0.4909 0.4992 0 1
Black 0.1214 0.3265 0 1
Married 0.6251 0.4840 0 1
Non-urban 0.2446 0.4298 0 1
Human Capitals
Education 13.8001 2.7637 0 21
Experience 20.8832 12.0756 0 59
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics of ONET and CPS Data for All by Occupation
Variable Managerial Clerical and Service Production Operators Transport
and Technical Sales Services
Cognitive Skills
Decision Making Ability 0.5454 0.4869 0.4370 0.4636 0.4157 0.4420
(0.0506) (0.0661) (0.0726) (0.0551) (0.0545) (0.0762)
Data Analyzing Ability 0.6743 0.5646 0.4971 0.5536 0.4915 0.5110
(0.0762) (0.0997) (0.1173) (0.0850) (0.0861) (0.1020)
Resource Management 0.4119 0.3140 0.2966 0.3163 0.2650 0.3085
(0.1044) (0.0829) (0.1060) (0.0811) (0.0632) (0.0918)
Non-cognitive Skills
Interaction With Others 0.5291 0.4365 0.4570 0.3996 0.3454 0.3987
(0.0924) (0.0972) (0.0830) (0.0824) (0.0702) (0.0906)
Interpersonal Relationship 0.5295 0.4916 0.4692 0.4330 0.3524 0.4236
(0.0737) (0.0693) (0.0947) (0.0683) (0.0752) (0.0744)
Social Skills 0.6919 0.6200 0.6192 0.4463 0.4463 0.5175
(0.1120) (0.1240) (0.1029) (0.0752) (0.0838) (0.1088)
Demographics Characteristics
Female 0.5434 0.6312 0.6071 0.0967 0.3049 0.1139
(0.4981) (0.4824) (0.4884) (0.2956) (0.4604) (0.3177)
Black 0.0944 0.1244 0.1760 0.0796 0.1509 0.1494
(0.2924) (0.3300) (0.3808) (0.2708) (0.3580) (0.3565)
Married 0.7119 0.5916 0.4986 0.6684 0.6072 0.5981
(0.4528) (0.4915) (0.5000) (0.4708) (0.4884) (0.4903)
Non-urban 0.2158 0.2317 0.2473 0.3001 0.3305 0.2896
(0.4114) (0.4219) (0.4316) (0.4583) (0.4704) (0.4536)
Human Capitals
Education 15.7535 13.6212 12.4658 12.3276 11.7957 11.9673
(2.3466) (2.0137) (2.5877) (2.4961) (2.7301) (2.3098)
Experience 21.0138 20.4722 19.3240 22.0613 23.2960 22.3064
(11.0807) (12.4396) (13.2020) (11.5910) (12.2218) (12.3047)
Income
Hourly Log Wage 3.2089 2.7621 2.4339 2.8868 2.6284 2.6653
(0.7058) (0.6661) (0.6350) (0.6067) (0.5841) (0.6175)
No of Obs 25, 646 22, 227 12, 786 8, 043 3, 358 5, 721
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Table 4.3: Labor Market Sorting Results for All Workers : Multinominal Logit Estimation
No Education Level as Threshold for Skilled Sector Occupation
Noncognitive Skills Clerical and Service Production Operators Transport
Sales Services
Interaction With Others 0.2462 1.7831 0.6501 0.3080 0.6751
(0.2272, 0.2671) (1.6210, 1.9601) (0.5881, 0.7180) (0.2680, 0.3530) (0.5941, 0.7680)
Interpersonal Relationship 4.3961 1.5120 2.6310 0.4840 2.2871
(4.1141, 4.6980) (1.4060, 1.6271) (2.4061, 2.8772) (0.4351, 0.5392) (2.0501, 2.2551)
Social Skills 1.9360 1.1880 0.0882 0.7410 0.1460
(1.8251, 2.0551) (1.1091, 1.2730) (0.0791, 0.0971) (0.6581, 0.8340) (0.1281, 0.1670)
High School Graduation as Threshold for Skilled Sector Occupation
Interaction With Others 0.2251 1.6432 0.7601 0.2810 0.7391
(0.2071, 0.2442) (1.4892, 1.8131) (0.6841, 0.8440) (0.2423, 0.3281) (0.6441, 0.8480)
Interpersonal Relationship 4.5011 1.5941 2.6920 0.5350 2.2511
(4.2062, 4.8160) (1.4790, 1.7182) (2.4501, 2.9580) (0.4772, 0.5991) (2.0050, 2.5282)
Social Skills 1.9900 1.1960 0.0700 0.9352 0.1380
(1.8721, 2.1140) (1.1142, 1.2850) (0.0620, 0.0781) (0.8220, 1.0630) (0.1201, 0.1590)
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Table 4.4: Labor Market Sorting Results By Gender : Multinominal Logit Estimation
No Education Level as Threshold for Skilled Sector Occupation
Clerical and Service Production Operators Transport
Sales Services
Male
Interaction With Others 0.1100 2.4640 0.6131 0.5440 0.6520
(0.0970, 0.1253) (2.1281, 2.8530) (0.5410, 0.6950) (0.4571, 0.6480) (0.5540, 0.7680)
Interpersonal Relationship 5.9510 7.2030 4.9000 0.4921 5.7651
(5.3651, 6.6001) (6.4191, 8.0832) (4.3742, 5.4901) (0.4230, 0.5392) (5.0091, 6.6340)
Social Skills 3.3381 0.4641 0.08001 0.6481 0.0951
(3.0281, 3.6803) (0.5181, 0.5180) (0.0712, 0.0913) (0.5501, 0.7621) (0.0800, 0.1120)
Female
Interaction With Others 0.3931 1.5550 0.9721 0.0351 1.5691
(0.3542, 0.4360) (1.3630, 1.7740) (0.7451, 1.2680) (0.0271, 0.0462) (1.1832, 2.0810)
Interpersonal Relationship 2.9071 0.0365 0.4120 0.5561 0.2780
(2.6421, 3.1972) (0.0326, 0.4092) (0.3221, 0.5271) (0.4692, 0.6593) (0.2171, 0.3572)
Social Skills 1.5880 2.4142 0.0851 2.5272 0.2142
(1.4591, 1.7282) (2.1870, 2.6660) (0.0650, 0.1102) (2.0301, 3.1442) (0.1672, 0.2752)
High School Graduation as Threshold for Skilled Sector Occupation
Male
Interaction With Others 0.0990 2.0822 0.6562 0.4752 0.6600
(0.0871, 0.1132) (1.7881, 2.4241) (0.5751, 0.7470) (0.3941, 0.5732) (0.5541, 0.7860)
Interpersonal Relationship 5.9551 7.8131 4.9343 0.5571 5.8371
(5.3570, 6.6200) (6.9340, 8.8041) (4.3832, 5.5542) (0.4760, 0.6531) (5.0290, 6.7753)
Social Skills 3.4830 0.4751 0.0732 0.6481 0.0093
(3.1511, 3.8512) (0.4232, 0.5332) (0.0641, 0.0842) (0.5501, 0.7621) (0.078, 0.1120)
Female
Interaction With Others 0.3721 1.5561 1.5972 0.0270 1.6600
(0.3350, 0.4140) (1.3582, 1.7821) (1.1920, 2.1402) (0.0200, 0.0371) (1.2331, 2.2332)
Interpersonal Relationship 3.0271 0.3811 0.4420 0.5901 0.2881
(2.7472, 3.3361) (0.3401, 0.4280) (0.3311, 0.5900) (0.4902, 0.7090) (0.2220, 0.3731)
Social Skills 1.5992 2.3900 0.0381 3.3271 0.2010
(1.4671, 1.7420) (2.1583, 2.6462) (0.0282, 0.0520) (2.5850, 4.2832) (0.1551, 0.2620)
116
Table 4.5: Labor Market Sorting Results for By Race : Multinominal Logit Estimation
No Education Level as Threshold for Skilled Sector Occupation
Clerical and Service Production Operators Transport
Sales Services
White
Interaction With Others 0.2260 1.8030 0.6632 0.3411 0.6021
(0.2081, 0.2460) (1.6271, 1.9972) (0.5960, 0.7371) (0.2490, 0.3950) (0.5241, 0.6920)
Interpersonal Relationship 4.5711 1.5932 2.6800 0.4531 2.6170
(4.2581, 4.9060) (1.4721, 1.7240) (2.4381, 2.9460) (0.4031, 0.5090) (2.3220, 2.9501)
Social Skills 2.0441 1.1682 0.0901 0.8151 0.1420
(1.9192, 2.1771) (1.0851, 1.2580) (0.0801, 0.1000) (0.7172, 0.9261) (0.1230, 0.1642)
Black
Interaction With Others 0.4570 2.0771 0.5230 0.1521 1.2451
(0.3640, 0.5750) (1.5931, 2.7091) (0.3821, 0.7170) (0.1040, 0.2241) (0.8810, 1.7580)
Interpersonal Relationship 3.5810 1.2762 2.9141 0.6741 1.3032
(2.9421, 4.3591) (1.0391, 1.5670) (2.2030, 3.8661) (0.5081, 0.8940) (0.9800, 1.7330)
Social Skills 1.3230 1.1190 0.0560 0.4461 0.1130
(1.1032, 1.5882) (0.9142, 1.3690) (0.0400, 0.0790) (0.3251, 0.6132) (0.0821, 0.1540)
High School Graduation as Threshold for Skilled Sector Occupation
White
Interaction With Others 0.2060 1.6552 0.7703 0.3141 0.6532
(0.1891, 0.2241) (1.4890, 1.8393) (0.6892, 0.8610) (0.2672, 0.3701) (0.5611, 0.7592)
Interpersonal Relationship 4.6941 1.6940 2.7340 0.4952 2.5882
(4.3670, 5.0451) (1.5632, 1.8371) (2.4751, 3.0210) (0.4370, 0.5611) (2.2781, 2.9410)
Social Skills 2.1050 1.1671 0.0721 1.0440 0.1323
(1.9742, 2.2461) (1.0812, 1.2600) (0.0640, 0.0810) (0.9082, 1.2002) (0.1130, 0.1552)
Black
Interaction With Others 0.4250 1.9201 0.6641 0.1381 1.3041
(0.3371, 0.5362) (1.4620, 2.5201) (0.4782, 0.9221) (0.0912, 0.2090) (0.0912, 1.8690)
Interpersonal Relationship 3.5892 1.3080 3.1001 0.7381 1.3492
(2.9380, 4.3842) (1.0601, 1.6132) (2.3072, 4.1662) (0.5510, 0.9890) (1.0070, 1.8093)
Social Skills 1.3370 1.1762 0.0410 0.5460 0.1131
(1.1092, 1.6120) (0.9540, 1.4492) (0.0281, 0.0592) (0.3892, 0.7661) (0.0822, 0.1580)
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